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Fictions of Omniscience
Karen Petroski1
Recent studies of the legislative process have questioned the rationales
for many principles of statutory interpretation. One of those traditional
rationales is the so-called fiction of legislative omniscience, thought to
underlie many judicial approaches to statutory decisions. This Article
presents the first comprehensive analysis of judicial assertions about
legislative awareness and proposes a different way of understanding them.
The proposed perspective compares fictions of legislative omniscience with
similar but more widely accepted imputations of knowledge in other areas of
law; it also draws on recent findings from other disciplines on the use and
comprehension of statements about fictional situations. The comparisons
suggest that, although judges impute unrealistic knowledge to legislatures,
that imputation need not be characterized as an unrealistic demand or a
naive simplification of reality. Rather, the imputation is an important part of
the account judges in our legal system typically give of legislative power.
According to that account, the legislature, responsible for uttering the law,
must have at least as much awareness of the law's content as the judiciary
does. Whether such awareness is possible is beside the point. Rather than
impairments of judicial legitimacy, judicial imputations of omniscience to
the legislature are descriptions of the necessarily aspirational grounds of
legal legitimacy.
' Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Anders Walker, Matt Bodie,
and Simon Stern, and to participants at the December 2013 meeting of the Law, Literature & the
Humanities Association of Australasia and at the 2014 Annual Conference of the Association for the
Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities for helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Samantha Schrage
for her research assistance.
2 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 170 (2d ed. 1921).
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INTRODUCTION
A statute is the expressed will of the legislative organ of a society; but until the
dealers in psychic forces succeed in making of thought transference a working
controllable force (and the psychic transference of the thought of an artificial
body must stagger the most advanced of the ghost hunters), the will of the
legislature has to be expressed by words, spoken or written . . . .
Harvard law professor John Chipman Gray first presented this ironically
resigned conclusion about the problem faced by statutory interpreters in 1909.
Minus the irony, commentators have consistently offered similar diagnoses for
most of the century since. Recent empirical work on the legislative process echoes
Gray's concerns and mirrors his desire to purge legal discourse of any hint of the
fantastic. Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman put it this way in a
recent article: "A threshold question for any empirical study of Congress is why
interpreters treat rules that they believe to be fictions as benign ones."' Their
implication is that rules believed to be fictions should not be understood as
harmless-at least not without some good explanation.
In that article and its companion, Gluck and Bressman have made important
contributions to a recent trend in scholarship on statutory interpretation, which has
moved from broad theoretical questions toward empirical studies and doctrinal
investigations. In many instances, this work has questioned longstanding
justifications for specific principles of statutory interpretation, including classic
canons of construction.s One such longstanding justification is the assumption of
legislative "omniscience,"6 which commentators have described as underlying many
canons and practices. This fiction proposes that the legislature, as the agent
responsible for enacting statutes, is somehow "aware" when it enacts those statutes
of all its past enactments as well as their application by courts and agencies, and
that courts may proceed to apply the legislature's enactments in light of that
supposed awareness. Part I of this Article explains the alleged pervasiveness of this
assumption, its fictional features, and the arguments that have been made against
it.
Many of those arguments, Part I explains, are little more than an epithet:
"fiction!" Strangely, critiques of the assumption of legislative omniscience have
seldom drawn on the substantial (if outdated) literature on legal fictions. This
failure might be due, as Part II.A suggests, to some deficiencies of that literature.
Work on legal fictions confirms the distaste judges and especially commentators
have for legal fictions, but it does not otherwise describe practices that look much
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafring, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
915 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part 1|.
s See id. at 902; see also, e.g., James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political
Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1201-02 (2010) (offering new critique of reliance
on canons).
' See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 800, 811 (1983); see also discussion of the "omniscience" label infra notes 151-156.
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like the assumptions of legislative omniscience described in Part I. Still, judges and
scholars persistently describe those assumptions as fictions. This mismatch between
theory and practice suggests that our traditional understanding of legal fictions may
be incomplete. Exploring that hypothesis, Part II.B surveys the advances made in
recent decades within other disciplines, including philosophy, cognitive science,
and literary studies, in understanding various features of fictional discourse. Legal
scholars have no good reason to continue to ignore this work, Part II concludes.
To explore the broader importance of both an updated understanding of legal
fictions and a more nuanced grasp of assumptions of legislative omniscience, Part
III explores other situations in which judges assume that real or legally constructed
figures have knowledge that is either empirically or logically unlikely. These
situations include the doctrine of constructive notice (in its many forms across
multiple areas of law); the traditional prohibition on asserting ignorance of law as a
defense to a criminal prosecution, often described as imputing a knowledge of the
law to the criminal defendant; and the fictional patent-law figure of the "person
having ordinary skill in the art," who has, among other characteristics, knowledge
of all pertinent "prior art." The existence of these other legal constructs sharing
features with assumptions of legislative omniscience supports the proposal
advanced in Parts I and II that those assumptions might be products of something
other than judicial ignorance or evasion.
Part IV returns to the central question of this Article: do assumptions of
legislative omniscience undermine judicial legitimacy by painting an unrealistic
portrait of lawmakers? The discussion in this concluding Part proposes an
alternative way of understanding judicial imputations of omniscience to legislatures.
On this account, these imputations are productive fictions, parts of a broader
account that judicial opinions necessarily provide about the authority of statutory
law and the aspirations of the legal system. Judges imply or presuppose legislative
omniscience not as an imperfect empirical assessment of legislative reality, but as a
direct expression of the grounds of statutory and judicial legitimacy, which is, and
will always be, an ideal to be sought, not an event that has already occurred.
I. FICTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE OMNISCIENCE
Judges sometimes explain their conclusions regarding the meaning or
application of statutory language by reference to information that the judge
assumes was known to "the legislature." This assumption may concern the
legislature's awareness of its own contemporaneous output,' of the output of earlier
sessions of the same legislature,' or of the way courts and agencies have interpreted
' See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec'y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (citing Helvering v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934) ("[I]dentical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning.")).
8 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(directing application of statute in manner "most compatible with the surrounding body of law into
which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume
Congress always has in mind.").
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the output of such earlier sessions.' Assumed legislative knowledge sometimes
extends, as well, to judicial decisionso and practices"n that are not necessarily
directly tied to the statutory provision that the court is currently applying. In
jurisdictions where voters have power to create law directly, judges sometimes
impute similar awareness to the voters as a collective lawmaker.12
This Article, following the practice of many legal writers, describes these
assumptions as imputations of a kind of "omniscience" to the legislature." Such
imputations have long been criticized by commentators. The criticism has recently
been strengthened by studies concerning the practices of and information available
to real-life legislators and legislative drafters. A principal goal of this Article is to
assess judicial imputations of legislative omniscience in light of these new empirical
critiques. First, however, it will describe (in Part I.A) the role that assumptions of
omniscience play in legal justification and the different forms these assumptions
take. Part I.B then clarifies commentators' critiques of these assumptions, and Part
I.C situates the recent empirical work within this context.
A. The Scope and Function of the Fictions
In a 1990 article, Professors Eben Moglen and Richard J. Pierce, Jr. described
the imputations noted above as examples of "the largely implicit factual
assumptions that judges make about the group behavior of legislators that are and
have been the foundation of judicial interpretation of legislative documents." 14
Moglen and Pierce identified these assumptions as "fictions."1" Sometimes, as in
the examples given above, courts will present such assumptions of omniscience
directly in justifying a result." But according to commentators, the assumptions are
' See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[W]here .. . Congress adopts a new law
incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress ... can be presumed to have had knowledge of the
interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.").
'o See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Judicial inference of a zone-of-interests requirement ... is a background practice against which
Congress legislates."); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (noting that it is
reasonable for courts to presume that Congress is aware of judicial precedent).
" See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) ("Congress is
understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.").
12 See, e.g., In re Harris, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1989) ("[T]he drafters who frame an initiative
statute and the voters who enact it may be deemed to be aware of the judicial construction of the law
that served as its source.").
"3 The scare quotes indicate that the knowledge courts attribute to lawmaking bodies is not
omniscience in the strictest sense; among other things, the knowledge courts deem legislatures to have is
primarily knowledge of legal texts. See Jonathan Culler, Omniscience, 12 J. SOC'Y FOR STUDY
NARRATIVE LITERATURE 22 (2004); see also infra notes 151-156 and accompanying text (examining
various uses of the "omniscience" label). Still, the knowledge courts impute to legislatures is in many
cases knowledge that actual legislators would not have, and there is a long tradition of referring to it as
"omniscience." See infra Part I.A.2.b.
14 Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of
Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1990).
15 id.
" See supra notes 7-12 for examples; see also table infra note 229.
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also closely related to a number of other statutory interpretation practices, including
many interpretive canons. Judge Posner, indeed, has described imputations of
omniscience as the principal justification for most canons of statutory
interpretation." When the assumptions function in this way, they are not always
directly asserted by judges; sometimes, they are read into judicial reasoning after
the fact by commentators.
Part IV will suggest that we should evaluate these two forms of the assumption
of omniscience differently. To clarify the complaints of commentators, Part I.A.1
will briefly survey the array of statutory-interpretation practices to which such
assumptions have been linked. Part I.A.2 then examines the structure of the
assumptions, regardless of who makes them, by examining whose knowledge is
assumed and what the "knower" is assumed to have knowledge of. Despite the
enduring criticism of these assumptions, they have never before been systematically
analyzed in this way.
1. Canons and Practices Presupposing Legislative Omniscience.-Judicial
assumptions of legislative omniscience are sometimes explicit.'s But according to
commentators, judges often presuppose legislative omniscience even when they do
not explicitly refer to it. Judicial practices presupposing omniscience run the gamut
from textual and structural canons of interpretation, to so-called substantive and
extrinsic-source canons, to broader methodological positions on the appropriate
judicial attitude toward statutory interpretation.
A number of widely followed textual and structural canons have been described
as presupposing legislative omniscience. The expressio unius canon, for example,
which directs a court to conclude that matter not expressly provided for in a
statute's text is outside the statute's coverage, has been characterized as based on an
assumption of omniscience, "because it would make sense only if all omissions in
legislative drafting were deliberate."" The rule against surplusage, instructing
courts to give independent meaning to every word of an enactment, has also been
so described.20 Even more obviously based on assumptions of omniscience is the
presumption of consistent usage underlying the "whole act" and "whole code" rules,
which direct courts to give a word the same meaning everywhere it appears in an
enactment or even the entire body of a legislature's output.21 This presumption, if
17 See Posner, supra note 6, at 811; accord Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part IIJ
(contending that accuracy of "details of congressional practice" is important to justifying canons of
interpretation); Bressman & Gluck, Part I, supra note 4, at 915 ("[T]he fiction of the unitary
drafter ... undergirds a huge number of interpretive rules. . . ."); Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14, at
1209 ("[T]he source of canons of construction, like other rules of interpretation, remains fiction.").
's See infra note 229.
" Posner, supra note 6, at 813; see also William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in
Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 226 (2000) (noting that canon "makes greatest sense
if the starting premise is something close to an omniscient legislative drafter.").
20 Posner, supra note 6, at 812.21 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16
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understood as tethered to legislative rather than judicial choices, seems to assume
that an enacting legislature was aware of the ways particular words were used, and
were meant to be used, in provisions enacted by previous sessions of the
legislature. 22
Commentators have also tied other well-known canons to assumptions of
legislative omniscience. Both the avoidance canon, which directs courts to apply
statutes so as to avoid constitutional concerns, 23 and the rule of lenity, which
instructs courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in defendants' favor, have
been so explained.2 4 Judicial conclusions about the significance of legislative action
(or inaction) following judicial interpretation of the provision being applied are
especially difficult to explain without reference to assumptions of legislative
omniscience. Of all the canons discussed here, these are the ones most often
involving express judicial assertions about legislative knowledge.2 Like all the
canons, of course, these inferences from legislative behavior are used irregularly by
courts. Judicial opinions do not always assume congressional awareness of prior
(1997) (referring to "fiction" underlying the principles that statutes should be construed as "internally
consistent" and "compatible with previously enacted laws"); Buzbee, supra note 19, at 173
("[C]ross-referencing of. . . provisions in different statutes is often justified with the use of the fiction
that there is one Congress that knows how to achieve a certain goal... when 'Congress wants' to do
so . . . ."); Stephen H. Sutro, Comment, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes:
Canons of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 945,
959 (1994) ("[When legislators adopt language of earlier statutes in new laws ... it is plausible to
assume that . . . the legislature acted with knowledge of the previous law. . . ." (internal emphasis
omitted)).
22 Other structural canons seem to rest on similar assumptions. One example is the presumption
against repeals by implication (the rule that an earlier statute conflicting with a later one should be
construed so as to keep both earlier and later enactments in effect). See Posner, supra note 6, at 812
(noting that the assumption that "whenever Congress enacts a new statute it combs the United States
Code for possible inconsistencies with the new statute . . . . would imply legislative omniscience in a
particularly ... unrealistic form"). Another illustration is the in pari materia rule (holding that
enactments on similar subjects should be construed consistently with one another). See Sutro, supra note
21, at 957 n.59 ("In pari materia rests on the premise that 'when a legislature enacts a provision, it has
available all the other provisions relating to the same subject matter. . . .'). The "borrowed statute" rule
(the rule that when a legislature enacts a measure modeled on an enactment in another jurisdiction, the
new enactment should be applied consistently with its application in the originating context) has also
been described as resting on this assumption of omniscience. See id. at 958 ("Where the legislature of
one jurisdiction adopts a provision . . . from . . . another jurisdiction, it is presumed that the enactment
was made with knowledge of the prior interpretation . . .").
23 James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 79 (1994) [hereinafter Brudney, Chatter] (noting
the grounding of the avoidance canon in "the assumption that legislators should be regarded as
reasonably aware of the existence of potential constitutional conflicts, including judicial decisions
identifying such conflicts . . .").
24 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 958 ("[J]udges and theorists have been ... wedded to
justifying lenity on the basis of congressional knowledge.").
25 These canons include the reenactment rule, which holds that "reenactment without change of a
statute that the courts have interpreted in a particular way may be taken as evidence that the
reenactment adopts that construction." Posner, supra note 6, at 813-14. The related acquiescence rule
holds that a legislature's failure to amend a statute indicates assent to controlling judicial interpretations
of that statute. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
71 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Inaction].
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judicial interpretations of statutes. Sometimes, courts point out the unlikeliness of
that assumption instead.26 Still, courts engage in these practices often enough to
make them the subject of much commentary."
Assumptions of legislative omniscience have also been described as underlying
broader positions on appropriate methods of statutory interpretation, including the
two main such positions today: purposivism and textualism. Purposivist
interpretation in the Hart and Sacks mold, which posits "reasonable legislators" as
the generators of statutory text, also seems to presuppose that those
legislators-not unlike the reasonable persons of other areas of law-have access to
information that might not be available to their real-life counterparts. 28 Textualism
has a more complex relation to assumptions of legislative omniscience. Some
aspects of textualism imply a more cynical view of legislators' capacities than
purposivism does.29 Yet textualists also rely heavily on many of the canons that
seem closely linked to assumptions of legislative omniscience,"0 and textualists
sometimes justify this reliance as a means of "disciplining" the legislature to draft
more consistently, apparently presupposing legislators' awareness of judicial
activity.
Judges do not make assumptions of legislative omniscience in every statutory
case, and sometimes they explicitly disavow making such assumptions. Still, the
notion seems to play a role in many accounts, by commentators and by judges
26 See Eskridge, Inacdon, supra note 24, at 75-76 (noting that "the Court [often] ... explain[s]
away legislative inaction by reference to Congress' ignorance of the prior interpretation or to the lack of
a clear line of interpretation by an agency or the courts").
27 See, e.g., Brudney, Chatter, supra note 23; Eskridge, Inaction, supra note 25.
28 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 88 (2005) ("At the heart of a purpose-based approach stands the 'reasonable member
of Congress'-a legal fiction . . . ."); Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14, at 1212 (noting Hart and Sacks's
awareness that their approach rested on a fiction); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress:
Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J.
1119, 1148-49 (2011) (describing purposivist view of Congress as "far too rosy").
29 See Nourse, supra note 28, at 1134 ('Textualists . .. rely upon theories that treat Congress with
contempt-assuming that its decisions can never be rational... ."); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) ("[Legislation] theorists
frequently work with ... a jaundiced view of the capacities of... legislatures.").
o Cf Buzbee, supra note 19, at 180 ("The United States Supreme Court has in recent years made
frequent use of the one-Congress fiction in its statutory interpretation cases. The practice appears most
frequently in the opinions of Justice Scalia."); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and
the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 851-52 (2014) ("There has been a
generally acknowledged trend toward textualist interpretation [relying on ordinary meaning and textual
canons rather than legislative history or policy arguments] . .. over the last fifty years.").
" See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process:
Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 157-58 (1997) ("[S]yntax canons
may ... aid Congress in understanding how the judiciary will interpret its statutes, by providing it with
a set of assumptions about how its statutes will be interpreted."). But see, e.g., Nourse, supra note 28, at
1174 ("[C]ourts do not have the institutional capacity to discipline themselves to send a consistent
enough message to Congress to change its behavior." (citing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006)).
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themselves, of what judges are doing when they interpret and apply statutes. It is
therefore a little surprising that these assumptions have never been systematically
dissected. The next section considers their structure.
2. False or Improbable Suppositions Involved.-Most assumptions of legislative
omniscience involve two distinct suppositions that are potentially contrary to fact.
One is that the legislature may be treated as a single intentional body. The other is
that this entity is in some sense "omniscient." These two suppositions are subject to
somewhat different criticisms.
2(a). Whose Knowledge.-Assumptions of legislative omniscience seem to
depend, as Professor Buzbee observed in a 2000 article, on the imputation of a
collective "mind" to a legislature: "In opinions employing the one-Congress fiction
[the treatment of successive sessions of the legislature as the same intending body],
the legislature is often anthropomorphized, in the sense that it is treated as if it
were a single natural person, albeit a person of superhuman omniscience and
consistency of style."32 This sort of personification of the legislature has long been
questioned, apart from any imputation of omniscience to the personified body.
Professor Radin's well-known 1930 broadside described it as an indefensible
ascription of mental properties to something that by definition lacks them." This
argument notes the unlikelihood of individual legislators sharing mental states in a
way that would allow observers to consider all those diverse mental states as part of
a single one. 34 Professor Radin's argument also asks how an after-the-fact
interpreter could ever gain access to this mental state, were it to exist.35 It is thus
not just an argument about conceptual categories, but also one about cognitive
limitations-an argument emphasizing our inability to read minds. Professor
Radin's and similar arguments have been enormously influential 6 but have never
completely prevailed. Judicial opinions and commentary continue to refer to
"legislative intent" and to argue for the value of the concept."
32 Buzbee, supra note 19, at 204-05. Professor Buzbee notes the paradox of the fiction as a
justification for textual canons, since it involves "an odd ... anthropomorphizing of the legislature by
justices who generally shun any references to legislative intent [and] decline to draw inferences from
legislative silence." Id. at 245.
" See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) ("The least
reflection makes dear that the [unitary] law maker ... does not exist, and only worse confusion follows
when in his place there are substituted the members of the legislature as a body. A legislature certainly
has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted ... .).
3 Id. at 870 ("That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an
immediate inference .... The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same
determinate situations in mind . . . are infinitesimally small.").
11 Id. at 870-71 ("It is not impossible that this knowledge could be obtained. But how improbable it
is, even venturesome mathematicians will scarcely undertake to compute.").
6 Professor Smith has argued, for example, that rejection of legislative intent as a fiction is a central
tenet of textualism. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1461-62 (2007).
" See, e.g., Richard Ekins & Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative
Intentions, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 39, 51-60 (2014). Further, Professor Bressman has argued that the
legislative intent construct is a fiction, but an "ordinary" and harmless, if not necessary, one. Lisa Schultz
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Recent scholarship, described in more detail in Part I.B below, has added to
this conceptual criticism of legislative personification an empirical dimension,
inspired by the emphasis that text-focused statutory interpretation places on the
details of legislative language. If we are concerned with the precise verbal
formulations enacted, this argument goes, then we should consider where these
formulations come from. Similarly, if courts want to send signals to the legislature
to improve drafting practices, courts would do well to identify drafters accurately.
More often than not, those who craft statutory language are not elected members
of the legislature," but professional drafters (career civil servants)," legislative
staffers,40 or lobbyists.41 So even if we were to accept that elected legislators could
act with one "mind" accessible to interpreters, this newer argument presents
problems for treating statutory text as the creation of a single intending agent. For
one thing, non-legislator drafters are not members of the political and legal body to
which courts profess fidelity. A distinct problem, reminiscent of Radin's concerns,
is that drafters do not necessarily communicate what they know to elected
legislators. Can the knowledge of non-elected drafters nevertheless be imputed to
legislators? I return to this question below.
2(b). Knowledge of What?-The second set of potentially unrealistic
suppositions involved in assumptions of legislative omniscience concerns the
matters assumed to be "known," taking for granted that there is some thing that
could "know" it. Here, too, the simple label "legislative omniscience" conceals some
complexity. Some of the knowledge imputed to legislators or legislatures is unlikely
to have been known to any real human lawmaker or drafter because of ordinary
human cognitive limitations. But some of the knowledge imputed would be
logically impossible for anyone to have.
The first category (knowledge unlikely to be known due to cognitive limits), in
turn, includes two kinds of imputed knowledge. First, it includes knowledge about
non-technical (i.e., non-legal) matters, such as the contents of other legislators'
minds and regularities of language usage.42 Second, and more commonly, it
Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2012-13,
2046-47 (2011).
3 Brudney, Chatter, supra note 23, at 53 ("Most members [of Congress] most of the time do not
participate in any way in drafting the text on which they are asked to vote.").
3 See generally Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 965-68 (noting prevalence of
'nonpartisan professional drafters"); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17, at 739-41 (noting work
by Legislative Counsel staffers); Shobe, supra note 30, at 826-29 (discussing "Legislative Counsel's Role
in Drafting").
' Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17, at 755-56. ("The other main legislative drafting staff
are personal staff-who work directly for elected members-and staff who work for the congressional
leadership, to draft statutes according to their member's preferences and with an eye towards
reelection.").
41 Id. at 758 (noting that more than a third of the drafters interviewed by the authors described first
drafts of bills as "typically written by ... policy experts and outside groups, like lobbyists"); Shobe, supra
note 30, at 847-49 ("Long-serving committee staff and legislative counsel anecdotally report that
lobbyist involvement in the drafting process has increased significantly over the last twenty years.").
4 Cf Stephen C. Mouritsen, Comment, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies
4852014-2015]
includes knowledge of specific legal information, such as other provisions of "the
code,"43 the acts and intentions of previous sessions of the legislature,4 intervening
judicial or agency decisions concerning a previous version of the statute being
interpreted,45 and/or interpretive principles used by courts.46
The second broad category-including information that even the best-informed
drafters and legislators could not possibly have-includes awareness of scenarios to
which the statute might, in the future, be argued to apply.4 7 This category also
includes the knowledge imputed to drafters and legislators of the content and
judicial interpretations of statutes not even enacted or proposed at the time of
enactment of the statute being applied.48
These kinds of imputed knowledge are analytically distinguishable but
sometimes superimposed. Professor Buzbee has described a related problem in
terms of "layers of knowledge":
[I]nterpretive inferences from interstatutory comparison ... require at least one, if
not both of the enacting Congresses to have the following highly unlikely layers
of knowledge. They must: (1) know what laws will be the subject of interstatutory
comparison, (2) know what linguistic consistency or inconsistency will be found
significant by a reviewing court, and (3) share a common set of "interpretive
conventions[.]""9
As Professor Buzbee's account suggests, he considers the "highly unlikely" nature of
this state of affairs-this compounding of impossibilities-to indicate the weakness
of the practices allegedly justified by these assumptions.5 0 His critical attitude
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1936 (2010) ("[H]uman
intuition about the frequency of lexical items is often unreliable.").
4 Posner, supra note 6, at 806 ("There is no evidence that members of Congress, or their assistants
who do the actual drafting, know the code. . . .").
"Buzbee, supra note 19, at 173; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
45 Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 816 (2002); Posner, supra note 6, at 813-14; see also supra note 25 (concerning the
reenactment rule).
* See, e.g., Brudney, Chatter, supra note 23, at 78-79 ("[Rleliance [on the canons] is justified in
part by the assumption that legislators should be thought of as reasonably attentive to and in agreement
with the 'background of customs and understandings of the way things are done.'"); Sharon L. Davies,
The jurisprudence of Willfilness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 398
(1998) ("[It is reasonable to presume that when Congress remains silent about the meaning of a
particular statutory term, it has done so with the expectation that the term will be construed in a fashion
consistent with prevailing canons of statutory interpretation.").
47 Posner, supra note 6, at 811 ("[A] statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect
appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application."); cE Edward L. Rubin,
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 61 (1991) (arguing that interpreting a statute by applying its literal language makes less sense
with older statutes because legislators are unable to envision how that language will apply in the future).
" Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1126 (2012) ("[T]he Supreme Court sometimes applies the one-Congress fiction in
order to render statutory language consistent with a judicial interpretation of a different statute that was
issued after the statute in question was enacted.").
4 Buzbee, supra note 19, at 234.
o Id.
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toward such assumptions is typical of contemporary commentators' views.
B. Criticisms and Defenses
Although he was not the first to criticize assumptions of legislative
omniscience,s" Judge Posner has done much to highlight the phenomenon. In 1983
he wrote: "Most canons of statutory construction go wrong not because they
misconceive the nature of judicial interpretation or of the legislative or political
process but because they impute omniscience to Congress. Omniscience is always
an unrealistic assumption, and particularly so when one is dealing with the
legislative process."52 Judge Posner's position is now virtually orthodoxy among
commentators, s3 and his complaint about the "unrealistic" character of the
assumption remains the central criticism of the practice. But this criticism takes
several different forms, and it is not universally accepted. This part summarizes the
main arguments against assuming legislative omniscience and the responses to
those arguments by commentators. Part I.C assesses the current state of the debate
after recent empirical interventions.
1. Criticism of the Fictions of Legislative Omniscience.-The longest-lived
argument against assumptions of legislative omniscience, as the above quote from
Judge Posner suggests, is that they are descriptively inaccurate. In 1940, Justice
Frankfurter characterized inferences from legislative inaction as based on
"speculative unrealities" and "quicksand."5 4 Writing thirty years after Judge Posner,
Professors Gluck and Bressman have largely reiterated this argument, at least as it
concerns drafters' awareness of (and agreement with) interpretive canons, with
s" Justice Frankfurter took issue with imputations of legislative omniscience, for example, more than
40 years before Posner published his well-known article. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
52 Posner, supra note 6, at 811.
53 See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators
and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47 (1991); Judge James L.
Buckley, Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124
F.R.D. 241, 312-13 (1989); Amanda Frost, Certi5ing Questions to Congress, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,
59-60 (2007) ("[N]either members of Congress nor their staffs are cognizant of the great majority of
judicial decisions addressing legislation within the jurisdiction of their committees."); John C. Grabow,
Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities",
64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 758 (1984) (noting that arguments from legislative acquiescence, if based on the
assumption that Congress is aware of judicial interpretations, are "absurd" given the "increase in the
number of judicial decisions"); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and
Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 654-55 (1992); Eric Lane,
Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 656
(1987) ("[T]o the extent that [the canons'] applicability requires legislative awareness that'the legislature
is deemed to have knowledge of the rules of construction,' this is not the case."); Moglen & Pierce,
supra note 14, at 1211 ("[M]ost legislators are ignorant of the overwhelming majority of 'legislative
history.' Frequently, they are entirely unaware of the literal content of the statute itself."). But see Levin,
supra note 48, at 1127 ("[T]he public is justified in relying on the one-Congress fiction to inform a
statute's meaning," and "the Court should adopt the one-Congress fiction because it protects and
respects legitimate reliance and expectations interests.").
54 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940).
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extensive empirical support.ss Assessing the current state of legal opinion on this
question, they endorse the "common notion that the 'omniscient' drafter
assumption is a fiction."56
Descriptive inaccuracy is the main problem with assumptions of legislative
omniscience, but not the only one. Judge Posner, again, was among the first to
point out other negative consequences of these assumptions. Canons based on
assumptions of legislative omniscience, he wrote, "promot[e] 'judicial activism' by
"making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative," thereby
"conceal[ing,] often from the reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the
writer, the extent to which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting
a statute or a constitutional provision."" Professor Buzbee, in his critique of the
"one-Congress fiction" used to justify canons of consistent usage, makes a similar
point.ss Ultimately, Professors Gluck and Bressman agree, although they use less
accusatory language: "[W]e can best understand these rule of law canons [such as
the presumption of consistent usage] . . . in terms of their appearance of neutrality
and the related desire to constrain judicial discretion." 9 Even if courts do not
intend to deceive by assuming legislative omniscience, these assumptions could be
understood as signs of a distinct judicial vice-not surreptitious activism, but
laziness or a kind of professional egocentrism, a disinclination to learn more about
the realities of legislative process and practice.o
A separate set of less prominent objections to assuming legislative omniscience
is based not on concerns with inaccuracy, but on concerns with incoherence.
Assumptions of legislative omniscience seem to be inconsistent with some other
judicial practices. When reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, for example,
s Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 907 ("[T]here were a host of canons that our
respondents [congressional counsel] told us that they do not use, either because they were unaware that
the courts relied on them or despite known judicial reliance [because of the respondents' awareness of
their descriptive inaccuracy].") (emphasis in original). According to Professors Gluck and Bressman, the
result of this congressional rejection and disregard for some canons means that "none of the publicly
stated justifications for their application holds." Id. at 954. Professors Gluck and Bressman present their
empirical study as a response to commentators' habit of referring to the so-called "descriptive" canons as
"accurate generalizations of the way legislators communicate through statutory text." Stephen F. Ross,
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 561, 572 (1992). Professor Ross also argued that inaccuracy is grounds for rejecting an interpretive
practice: "As for the canon that nothing in statutory text can be treated as surplusage, even if Congress
were too embarrassed to admit to its sloppy drafting habits by overturning the canon itself, perhaps this
canon too is so contrary to real life experience that courts should simply stop using it." Id.
56 Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17, at 738.
57 Posner, supra note 6, at 816-17.
s Buzbee, supra note 19, at 236 ("When courts start to refer to materials other than the primary
textual provision, ... they . .. have given themselves a more open interpretive field."); cf Grabow, supra
note 53, at 752 ("By attributing to Congress' silence its acquiescence in a judicial or administrative
construction ... the Court is able to act as if it is merely finding, rather than making the law. This
allows the Court in effect to shield its exercise of choice.").
s Gluck & Bressman, Parr I, supra note 4, at 962.
a See, e.g., Muriel Morisey, Liberating Legal Education from the Judicial Model, 27 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 231, 267 (2003) ("The canons of construction and convenient judicial maxims are used
as substitutes for careful statutory analysis.").
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courts arguably assume something close to the opposite of legislative omniscience.61
It also seems inconsistent for courts to impute to legislatures an awareness of
context that courts themselves may admit to lacking.62 A more extreme critique,
harking back to Professor Radin, contends that statutes and judicial applications of
them do not form a coherent body of information, so that imputing knowledge of
this information to legislatures does not provide rational support for judicial
conclusions.6
Given the wide agreement that, for whatever reason, assumptions of legislative
omniscience are indefensible, what explains their persistent use, both in explicit
judicial statements and as unstated premises for such an array of judicial practices?
One possibility is that the assumptions are not always as problematic as the
commentary has assumed. Eventually, I will argue for this position. However, as I
show below, this argument has not previously been made and defended in a way
that avoids the criticisms just outlined. Another possibility is that some judicial
practices that we view as based on this assumption can be better justified on other
grounds. Professors Gluck and Bressman have suggested this possibility in their
recent work, discussed in Part I.C. Before examining their position, I turn to
existing defenses of assumptions of legislative omniscience.
2. Responses to the Criticisms-Courts and commentators sometimes assert
the legitimacy of assumptions of legislative omniscience without considering their
descriptive accuracy. 64 Increasing acceptance of the criticisms described above,
however, has made such assertions more vulnerable.
An alternative response is to directly question the main objection to
assumptions of legislative omniscience: the claim that they are descriptively
inaccurate. This response may be understood as a challenge to the "omniscience"
label or as a challenge to the position that canons may only be justified by reference
to these assumptions. Either way, some judicial practices seem easy to justify
without assuming legislative omniscience or telepathy. Professor Buzbee, for
instance, has argued that the expressio unius canon is less offensive on the score of
descriptive inaccuracy than is the practice of applying the same interpretation to a
" See Muriel Morisey Spence, What Congress Knows and Sometimes Doesn't Know, 30 U. RICH.
L. REv. 653, 660 (1996) (noting the Supreme Court's "movement away from judicial deference to
Congress' factual deliberations and conclusions" in certain areas of constitutional law). Spence argues
that this movement is related to, or at least has an affinity with, textualism, in that both "enhance
judicial power at the expense of Congress." See id. at 679-81.
62 Cf Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14, at 1232 ("[The] caseload [of judges] precludes them from
engaging in extensive research to determine the combination of political pathologies that gave rise to a
particular statutory provision . . . ."); id. at 1233, 1241-42, 1244 (discussing the inevitability of
inconsistency in interpretive conclusions, given the distributed nature of the federal judiciary and the
limited caseload capacity of Supreme Court).
6 See, e.g., Eskridge, Inaction, supra note 25, at 83 ("Congress cannot be presumed to 'know' an
administrative interpretation that is unsettled even in the minds of the administrators.").
6 See, e.g., supra Part I.A.1; see also Davies, supra note 46, at 398 ("The notion that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of existing law-including both statutory and judge-made law-is no
novel proposition."); Mank, supra note 45, at 868 ("It is appropriate to assume that Congress is aware of
significant judicial decisions when it enacts a statute.").
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term appearing in statutory provisions enacted at different times."s Other scholars
have pointed out that many drafters examine statutory context before drafting a
new provision;6 6 that official drafting manuals reflect some of the canons often
justified by reference to legislative omniscience;67 that committee staff may be
aware of "major" judicial decisions relevant to proposed legislation;" and that
legislators sometimes do register awareness of (some) judicial interpretations in
legislative history documents.69 Professors Gluck and Bressman acknowledge that
some drafters are aware of, and rely on, some judicial and scholarly practices,
including some canons and case law, consistent with judicial assumptions to this
effect.o A recent article by Jarrod Shobe, discussed at more length in Part I.C,
explains in detail how drafters' examination of statutory context and relevant
judicial actions, as well as awareness of judicial practices in applying statutes, has
become more common in the federal legislature since the 1990s."
A slightly different response to criticisms of legislative omniscience accepts
omniscience as a worthwhile goal and seeks to increase the descriptive accuracy of
the assumption by, in effect, enabling closer approximations to omniscience
through institutional design. Mechanisms already exist in many states for
informing legislators of judicial activity and of the effects of particular enactments
6s Buzbee, supra note 19, at 228-29 ("The expressio unius canon ... is ... aspirational, but it does
not rest on counterfactual assumptions of omniscient legislators able to know both the universe of
similar provisions in other statutes and which provisions and linguistic differences would be viewed as
significant by a reviewing court.").
" CE Barry Jeffrey Stern, Teaching Legislative Drafting: A Simulation Approach, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 391, 394 (1988) ("I ask students to accompany their drafts with commentary that reviews the
coverage of the proposed statutes and highlights differences between the proposal and existing law.").
6 See B.J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory
Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 193 (2010) (listing canons of consistent usage, the rule against
surplusage, and the rule against implied repeals as "supported by federal legislative drafting manuals").
6 Frost, supra note 53, at 4 ("[O]n many occasions Congress has recognized judicial confusion
about the meaning of legislation and amended unclear statutory language."); id. at 29-34 (discussing
cases and studies documenting this recognition, including Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof,
Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61 (2001)). But see
Katzmann, supra note 53, at 662 (discussing the results of a statutory revision project finding that
committee staff were generally unaware of relevant court decisions unless they were "major").
6 See Brudney, Chatter, supra note 23, at 64 ("[I]f a reenacted statute contains numerous and
substantial modifications in text, if it was enacted following a more inclusive legislative process, and if
the case commented on by the committee has been more prominently featured in public debate, there is
a stronger basis for imputing such familiarity and endorsement to Congress.").
" Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 949 (describing "feedback canons": canons that
respondents are aware the court uses and incorporate when drafting for that reason); id. at 948
("Thirteen percent [of respondents] . . . said that they examine prior [constitutional] case law .. . in
anticipation ofjudicial ruling.").
" Shobe, supra note 30, at 813 ("Today, statutes are thoroughly researched and written by large
groups of experts who are more aware of what courts and agencies are doing than ever before . . . ."); id.
at 827 ("Legislative counsel view part of their role as helping staff to understand the existing statutory
framework and how a new bill will fit into that framework."); id. at 831-32 (arguing that legislative
drafters are increasingly aware of canons of interpretation); id. at 842 ("[A]ttorneys in [the American
Law Division, an office of the Congressional Research Service,] are especially responsible for providing
analysis of case law and constitutional issues, while legislative counsel are especially attuned to how laws
fit in to the current statutory scheme.").
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on other parts of the jurisdiction's code-and vice versa, for informing judges of
legislative activity responding to judicial interpretations.72 A similar mechanism has
been repeatedly recommended at the federal level." Jarrod Shobe's position, noted
above, is that we have basically already achieved this goal: he maintains that such
mechanisms do exist de facto in the federal Congress, through the combined efforts
of drafters in the Offices of Legislative Counsel, the American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service, and committee staffers. 74
Not all responses to the criticisms outlined in Part I.B.1 focus on the descriptive
accuracy of assumptions of legislative omniscience. Some commentators have
argued that it is rarely if ever necessary to assume legislative omniscience because
the practices usually justified by reference to this assumption can be justified on
other grounds, such as an independent judicial obligation to ensure legal
coherence. 7s Most recently, Professors Gluck and Bressman have suggested that
many
canons derive their most powerful justification from "rule of law" norms-the idea
that interpretive rules should coordinate systemic behavior or impose coherence
on the corpus juris. Justices Scalia and Breyer . .. have suggested that even
fictitious canons are justifiable on the ground that it is the role of courts to impose
systemic coherence on the law.'
This position is not strictly speaking a defense of the assumption of omniscience,
but an argument for retaining some of the practices commentators have
traditionally justified by reference to the assumption.
In this sense, none of the positions described so far really amount to a defense
of the assumption of omniscience itself. Only a few commentators have taken this
more radical position. One way to defend the assumption directly is to describe it
as no more descriptively inaccurate than any of the other assumptions lawyers and
judges routinely make in applying legal texts and attributing motivation to actors.
72 See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 53, at 1060-73 (describing such mechanisms in states
like North Carolina, Alaska, Oregon, New York, and Mississippi).
7 See, e.g., id. at 1048-49, 1076 (describing such proposals, including those by Judge Benjamin
Cardozo, Judge Henry Friendly, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg); Frost, supra note 53, at 24
(discussing these proposals); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, Commentary, The Intercircuit
Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1417-20 (1987); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A
Mechanism for "Statutory Housekeeping": Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. App. PRAC.
& PROCESS 131, 140 (2007) (discussing the potential benefits of a project to make House and Senate
Legislative Counsel more aware of basic rules and principles when drafting legislation).
74 See generally Shobe, supra note 30, at 818-51 (discussing the Offices of the Legislative Counsel,
the Congressional Research Service, and committee staffers).
7 For example, Professor Eskridge has argued that the drawing of inferences from legislative
inaction can be justified by reference to principles of public notice and reliance. Eskridge, Inaction,
supra note 25, at 108 ("[W]hat the Court is doing in these cases is to place upon Congress the
institutional burden of responding to 'building block' agency and judicial interpretations of statutes
when Congress disagrees with them."). Similarly, Professor Buzbee has argued that the "one-Congress
fiction" might be justified by "the Court's obligation to make sense of the corpus juris." Buzbee, supra
note 19, at 193.
76 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 961.
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Professors Moglen and Pierce's 1990 article contains the most elaborate
articulation of this position to date.n
As Parts II through IV will show, I am sympathetic to this view but believe it
can be presented even more convincingly. One problem with the argument
presented by Professors Moglen and Pierce is that it bears the now-discredited
marks of poststructuralism circa 1990, a theoretical attitude that no longer
commands wide respect. Indeed, one could conceive of the differences between the
positions of Professors Moglen and Pierce, on the one hand," and Professors
Gluck and Bressman, as well as Jarrod Shobe, on the other, as a portrait in
miniature of changing fashions in legal interdisciplinary work from 1990 to
2015-a turn from humanities-oriented to social science-oriented models for
arguments about legal method.
C. Current Debates
Statutory-interpretation scholarship, like many other areas of legal scholarship,
has recently taken an empirical turn. Some especially prominent examples of this
vein of scholarship bear directly on the topic of this Article: what we can and
cannot assume to be known to the generators of statutory language. In two articles
in the Stanford Law Review, Professors Gluck and Bressman have reported on
their survey of 137 legislative drafters in the federal Congress;79 in the Columbia
Law Review, Jarrod Shobe places some of their conclusions in question based on
his own set of interviews and his personal experience in the federal Office of
Legislative Counsel for the House of Representatives.o This Part explores the light
these recent interventions shed on the subject of this Article.
Both studies presume that the knowledge and intentions of the actual drafters
of legislation do and should matter to judicial practices. Both studies indicate that
this knowledge matters because courts refer to it in explaining their activity with
respect to statutes." One of the main targets of Professors Gluck and Bressman's
n Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14, at 1208 ("[S]ometimes it is necessary for us to create fictive
contexts ... to understand complex and ambiguous events."); id. at 1208-09 ("Interpretive fictions are
conventionalized descriptions that make communication comprehensible by providing a common basis
for the social process of interpretation. Many if not most interpretive fictions recount a stylized view of
the speaker or main participant."); id. at 1217 ("Fiction is a response to the indeterminacy problem: if
we cannot ascertain the actual facts that lie behind words, we can at least agree on a story about the
origin of those words that permits consistent interpretation under most circumstances."); see also, e.g.,
Brudney, Chatter, supra note 23, at 82 ("Discerning motivation or attributing collective understanding,
based on a record that documents oral as well as written statements, is a traditional judicial function that
competent and fair-minded judges should be expected to perform.").
" See, e.g., Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14, at 1216 ("The practical obstacles to determining the
reality of the legislative process ... are merely a due to the deeper intractability of the enterprise
resulting from the inherent indeterminacy of the historiographic process itself.").
G Cluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4; Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17.
" Shobe, supra note 30, at 811.
* One could read Professors Gluck and Bressman as more narrowly criticizing the textualist
"disciplining" justification for the use of text-focused canons, but they do not seem to regard their goal
as limited in this way. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 3, at 951 ("[J]udges rarely justify their use
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studies is the default model of judicial attitudes toward the legislature in the
statutory-interpretation context-what Gluck and Bressman call, following
standard practice, the "faithful-agent" model, under which the court's role is to
effectuate what the legislature has signaled it wants done.82 Gluck and Bressman
argue that this model assumes facts about the making of statutes that in many cases
do not match reality. They conclude that courts and commentators should develop
new justifications for judicial practices to replace those justifications, like the
faithful-agent model, that are out of step with drafters' understandings of the
legislative process or that drafters simply do not consider optimal. If courts and
commentators cannot develop such justifications, Gluck and Bressman contend,
courts should stop engaging in the practices." Practices falling into this category, in
their account, include several of the most popular canons typically linked to
assumptions of legislative omniscience, including the presumption of consistent
usage.84 This argument extends the standard critique of assumptions of legislative
omniscience described above, applying it to a greater number of practices and
providing new data supporting the claim of descriptive inaccuracy. Like those
earlier criticisms, however, this theory is grounded in a concern about basing
judicial practices on descriptively inaccurate suppositions.
Without targeting assumptions of omniscience explicitly, Professors Gluck and
Bressman hint at their awareness of the double fictionality of that assumption.
They note that the traditional justifications for many canons assume not only an
omniscient drafter, but a single type of omniscient drafter.ss Their second article
stresses the fragmented character of the drafting process, in which different types of
staffers have input at different stages into different aspects of a draft, and often do
not communicate with staffers working on other aspects of the draft or other
drafts." As a result, Professors Gluck and Bressman concede that it might not be
of canons as entirely unrelated to congressional practice-no doubt because such justifications are
difficult to reconcile with the faithful-agent paradigm . . . and the related desire not to appear
'activist.'").
82 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 907 ("[I]n light of our findings, the faithful-agent
model seems incapable of bearing the full weight of modern interpretive practice.").
s They note that some canons not endorsed by drafters may be justified on rule-of-law
grounds-by courts' obligation to impose coherence on the law-but note that this justification is
jeopardized by courts' irregular use of canons. Gluck & Bressman, Part , supra note 4, at 962 ("[B]oth
coherence and coordination arguably provide justification for any ... interpretive rule. ... But we do
not believe that judges are successfully applying the current interpretive regime to advance rule of law
goals.").
4 Id. at 955-56 ("[l]n the context of both the rule against superfluities and the whole act and whole
code rules, one might imagine continued application of those canons in those limited circumstances in
which one can confirm that they do approximate drafting reality."); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra
note 17, at 783-84 (noting that "presumptions of consistent usage . . . [and] the rule against
superfluities ... seem ripe for elimination if a drafting-based model [of justification] is the goal").
s Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17, at 738 ("This is a bigger point than the common
notion that the 'omniscient' drafter assumption is a fiction. Even assuming an omniscient drafter exists,
there are simply too many categories of different types of omniscient drafters to make general
assumptions across them.").
6 Id. at 746-47 (discussing this problem within the Offices of the Legislative Counsel); id. at
749-50 (same with respect to congressional committee staffers' knowledge and jurisdiction). Professors
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possible to sum up in any descriptively accurate way "the kind of staff, process, and
structural variety"87 that in fact characterizes the legislative process." Given all of
these problems with the canons-problems that have, after all, been pointed out for
decades, if not always supported so devastatingly-why do judges continue to insist
on assuming a posture of faithful agency (or, in the terms with which this Article is
concerned, making any assumptions about what legislators do or do not know)? On
this point, as suggested above, Professors Gluck and Bressman appear to agree with
Judge Posner: courts do this because they fear being seen as "lawmakers" rather
than "law appliers."89
Jarrod Shobe's recent article challenges some of these points while agreeing
with others. Shobe argues that drafters are more aware of many of the canons and
other matters they are traditionally assumed to know than accounts like those of
Professors Gluck and Bressman allow. Specific canons supposedly based on
assumptions of omniscience, such as the "whole act" rule, the rule against implied
repeals, and the in pari materia rule, may in fact be based on accurate assumptions
about drafters' knowledge of other statutes and other parts of an enactment.90
Shobe does not go so far as to claim that assumptions of legislative omniscience are
factually accurate. He grants that the information known to drafters is distributed
across many individuals, 9 acknowledges that drafters do not always share
information when multiple legislators are working on parallel proposals,92 and
concedes that drafters cannot always anticipate scenarios in which the language
they draft may be ambiguous.93 Nevertheless, his account shares important features
with Professors Gluck and Bressman's. Shobe, too, assumes that descriptive
accuracy about drafters' knowledge and intentions is an appropriate goal. lindeed,
he embraces this goal more unequivocally than Professors Gluck and Bressman do.
His conclusions differ from theirs only in the connection he perceives between
Gluck and Bressman acknowledge that Legislative Counsel are aware of legal context, including judicial
decisions, other statutes, and interpretive principles, but stress the limits of this awareness due to the
"silo[ing]" of Legislative Counsel. Id. at 746-47 (noting that eleven of twenty-eight Legislative
Counsels interviewed opined that the specialization of Legislative Counsel is "an impediment to
consistent usage across statutes involving different subjects or different committees").
' Id. at 736.
" Id. at 738 ("[A] theory based on how Congress drafts may be impossible to accomplish."); id. at
779 (querying how valuable it would be to reground interpretive principles on actual practice "when
much of what is uncovered [about actual practice] is too complex or otherwise impossible for doctrine to
absorb," e.g., "information about individual staff reputations" that is important to drafting choices); id.
at 782-83 (making similar point about knowledge of committee jurisdiction and history).
9 Id. at 778 ("The pull of th[e] faithful-agent premise derives from the persistent discomfort that
judges have in admitting 'lawmaking' in the statutory context. . . .").
" Shobe, supra note 30, at 859-60 (noting, inter alia, that "[a] modern statute... is generally
drafted by a group of drafters who are aware of the contents of the entire statute," and concluding that
"judges should use these canons with greater confidence when interpreting modern statutes").
9 See id. at 842 ("[A]ttorneys in ALD are especially responsible for providing analysis of case law
and constitutional issues, while legislative counsel are especially attuned to how laws fit in to the current
statutory scheme.").
92 Id. at 828.
9' Id. at 875 (noting that this type of ambiguity of application, which Shobe calls "dynamic
ambiguity," "is impossible to eradicate").
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judicial imputations of knowledge and reality: Shobe contends that drafters are, if
not omniscient, at least far more aware than skeptics claim.
This debate thus comes down to a disagreement over the degree of descriptive
inaccuracy in assumptions of omniscience (and related assumptions about
legislators' and drafters' mental states). All parties to the debate seem to accept
that, to be justified, imputations of omniscience to the legislature should be at least
approximately accurate. 94 Deeply illuminating as they are, neither of these two
recent accounts considers whether assumptions of omniscience might be justifiable
on grounds other than descriptive accuracy. The rest of this Article explores
resources and arguments suggesting this possibility, with a focus on accounts of
similar unrealistic mental-state attributions outside the law (Part II) and elsewhere
in the law (Part III).
II. WHAT WE (DON'T) KNOW ABOUT LEGAL FICTIONS
Commentators sometimes express their concern about the descriptive
inaccuracy of assumptions of legislative omniscience by labeling the assumptions
"fictions."95 In this way, critics of these assumptions can draw on the connotations
of illegitimacy that the "fiction" label has long carried in Anglo-American law.9 6 As
the author of a 2002 Harvard Law Review student note put it, "the term 'legal
fiction' has.. . . become nothing more than a catchphrase used casually to dismiss
particular falsities in the law."97
As this quote suggests, and as Part II.A will explain, calling assumptions of
omniscience "fictions" does not significantly advance our understanding of
them-but this is due more to the deficiencies of legal thinking about fictions than
anything else. With only a few exceptions, legal scholarship has treated legal
fictions as unrelated to, or at least different in kind from, other types of "fiction"
that people generate and use. Work on legal fictions has accordingly been largely
9 Neither side directly takes on the older, legal realist-influenced critique of legislative
personification. Commentators do touch on that problem, but they discuss it in terms of institutional
design and information management, rather than category confusion or telepathy.
" See, e.g., Note, Lessons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the Law,
115 HARv. L. REV. 2228, 2249 (2002) [hereinafter Lessons from Abroad] ("Regardless of the reasons
for the decline of th[e] old debate [over 'substantive legal fictions'], it is still early in the debates over the
interpretive ... fictions [e.g., fictions of legislative omniscience]. These fictions ... are more subtle and
more sophisticated . . ., but it is precisely for these reasons that [they] are potentially more dangerous.").
9 Although criticism of legal fictions predates him, Jeremy Bentham still epitomizes this attitude.
Bentham abhorred legal fictions: "[I]n English law, fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every vein, and
carries into every part of the system the principle of rottenness." Jeremy Bentham, The Elements of the
Art of Packing, As Applied to Specialjuries, Particularly in Cases of Libel Law, in 5 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (J. Bowring ed., 1843) (emphasis in original); see also C. K. OGDEN,
BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS cxvi (1932); Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have
They Proved Useful or Detrimental to Its Growth?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 250 (1893); Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg, Bentham's Theory of Fictions-A "Curious Double Language", 11 CARDOZO STUD. L.
& LITERATURE 223 (1999) (explaining the relationship between Bentham's theory of legal fictions and
his broader theory of linguistic fictions).
' Lessons from Abroad, supra note 95, at 2249.
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inattentive to studies of fictions and fictionalizing in other disciplines-including,
notably, philosophy, cognitive science, and literary studies-done over the past
several decades." Part II.B considers some conclusions of this non-legal work
relevant to the subject of this Article.
A. Legal Fictions
Most legal commentators-though not all-agree about the defining
characteristics of legal fictions. As this part will explain, however, those
agreed-upon characteristics are oddly limited, do not seem to match how lawyers
and laypeople persistently use the term "fiction," and fail to justify the term's
negative legal connotations. Although scholarship on legal fictions does provide
some useful concepts for thinking about and evaluating the assumptions described
in Part I, it leaves just as many questions unanswered.
1. Legal Fiction Orthodoxy.-Over more than two centuries of
Anglo-American writing on legal fictions, two components of the term's classic
definition have remained largely unchanged. First, virtually all commentators agree
that legal fiction is distinct from deceptive falsehood. Both fictions and falsehoods
involve departures from truth, but a fiction's lack of descriptive accuracy is known,
not concealed." There has been little agreement, however, about exactly what kind
of things merit the "legal fiction" label, that is, whether a legal fiction is a concept
or thought, a factual proposition (a reference to a state of affairs in the world), a
linguistic formulation, or something more like a legal rule."'
" Partial counterexamples include: David Gawthorne, Fictionalising Jurisprudence: An
Introduction to Strong Legal Fictionalsm, 38 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 52 (2013) (discussed infra note
131); Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14; Stolzenberg, supra note 96; Lessons from Abroad, supra note 95.
" Jeremy Bentham defined the term in this way: "By fiction, in the sense in which it is used by
lawyers, understand a false assertion of [a] privileged kind,. .. which, though acknowledged to be false,
is at the same time argued from, and acted upon, as if true." Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in 9
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 76-77, at 1-2 (J. Bowring ed., 1843). An 1893 article in the
Harvard Law Review quotes Best as defining a fiction as "a rule of law which assumes as true, and will
not allow to be disproved, something which is false, but not impossible." Mitchell, supra note 96, at 252.
Lon Fuller provided a largely parallel account in 1930, defining a legal fiction as either "(1) a statement
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as
having utility." LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) (Fuller originally published the essays,
later republished as LEGAL FICTIONS, in the Illinois Law Review in 1930 and 1931); see also, e.g.,
Comment, Prolegomenon to Myth and Fiction in Legal Reasoning, Common Law Adjudication and
Critical Legal Studies, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1989) ("[A] legal fiction is an analytical device
in which a court recognizes the falsity of a particular proposition, but consciously treats the proposition
as true in its reasoning."); Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory: Some
Historical Reflections, 10 TEL AVIv U. STUD. L. 33, 35-36 (1990) ("A legal fiction is a proposition...,
which rests in whole or in part on factual premises known to be inaccurate .... ).
" Pierre J.J. Olivier, author of the most comprehensive recent treatment of legal fictions (one that
addresses European as well as Anglo-American approaches), canvasses the variations and argues that the
label should be applied only to factual propositions used as premises for legal reasoning, not to rules or
statements of other kinds. See PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL
SCIENCE 35 (1975) ("[I]t is wrong to say [as Fuller does] that a fiction is a statement: a fiction is an
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The second widely accepted feature of legal fictions concerns their purpose. The
classic account in English-language commentary is that legal fictions are a way for
judges to adapt law to unforeseen circumstances: legal fictions let a judge (and the
parties) pretend the facts of a case are something other than what they are.'01 A
corollary of this point is that fictions are necessary only when such adaptation is
necessary. If legal rules change to accommodate new circumstances, then fictions
are no longer needed and become objectionable."0 2 Notably, this view of legal
fictions does not contemplate their use by commentators. Unlike their Continental
counterparts, Anglo-American legal scholars lack a strong tradition of
self-awareness about the fictions they use to explain judicial (and other legal)
activity.1o3
Consensus on these points in Anglo-American writing has not contributed to
agreement on other aspects of the phenomenon. Work on legal fictions has had a
frustrating tendency to develop a new set of principles and a new framework for
classification with each new study.' 04 These taxonomies have not built on one
another, resulting in a proliferation of overlapping frameworks instead of a single
increasingly elaborated one. In the mid-nineteenth century, Sir Henry Maine
described legal fictions as just one of three kinds of devices for legal response to
changed circumstances, the other two being equity and legislation.' On Maine's
account, legal fictions were the most primitive such devices, tending to be
supplanted by equity and then by legislation as legal systems matured. Later writers
have not necessarily perceived legal fictions as competing with legislation in this
way. In 1893, for example, Oliver Mitchell classed legal fictions in three categories:
assumption, a process of thought which may be subsequently expressed as a statement, but it is not in
the first place a statement.").
"' Sir Henry Maine was a prominent advocate of this position. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE,
ANCIENT LAw 21-22 (1986) ("I ... employ the expression 'Legal Fiction' to signify any assumption
which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter
remaining unchanged, its operation being modified."); see also OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 89-90
("Anglo-American jurists see [concealment of the fact that 'a judicial decision is not in harmony with
the existing law'] as the main function of the fiction in law."); Mitchell, supra note 96, at 262 ("The only
use and purpose ... of any legal fiction is to nominally conceal this fact that the law has undergone a
change at the hands of judges.").
102 This position was especially strongly articulated by Hans Vaihinger, but it is still widely held.
See, e.g., H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'As IF': A SYSTEM OF THE THEORETICAL,
PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND 12-13, 98 (C.K. Ogden trans., 1924); James B.
Stoneking, Note, Penumbras and Privacy A Study of the Use of Fictions in Constitutional
Decision-Making, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 859, 865 (1985) ("A fiction's status as a temporary measure
seemingly calls for its eventual removal.").
103 Olivier is critical of Anglo-American writers for "concentrat[ing] exclusively on one aspect [of
legal fictions], viz. that the fiction conceals . .. the fact that a judge is allowed, under cloak of the
fiction, to 'change' the law. .. . [This] represents a one-sided view of the function of the legal
fiction.... [L]egal fictions are not only employed by judges, but by legislators and legal scientists."
OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 36.
" See, e.g., id. at 18 ("After [Dutch author T.] Boey [who defined "fiction" in a 1773 legal
dictionary published in the Netherlands], all remembrance of this definition and of the elements of the
fiction concept seems to have sunk into oblivion. Jurists seem to be struggling to define and analyse the
fiction de novo.").
os MAINE, supra note 101, at 20.
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the first two involved judicial assertions of unproven facts for purposes of applying
a legal rule, like Maine's understanding of legal fictions, while the third comprised
what Mitchell calls "[f]ictions of relation,"' 6o or fictions involving imputation or
deeming, something that could occur pursuant to a legislative act.' Then, in the
early 1930s, Lon Fuller classed the legal fictions addressed by Maine, Mitchell, and
other legal writers as "fictions of legal technique," '' contrasting them with
"jurisprudential fictions."109
These commentators, and others, agreed on a few basic points-that fictions
are distinct from falsehoods and that judges sometimes use them to reach just
results when the law seems outmoded or too restrictive-but overall, their work did
not generate any clear agenda for legal reform or scholarship. In the half-century
since Fuller's book of essays was published, legal academics have only occasionally
addressed the topic. Usually, they have followed Bentham in considering legal
fictions objectionable because they do not correspond to anything in the actual
world. 110 Much less often, legal academics have argued that fictions are a
permanent feature of legal discourse and do not deserve their negative reputation.
Both perspectives are unsatisfactory. The traditional critique of legal fictions has
trouble explaining the persistence of constructs that we keep calling by that name,
other than by reference to persistent judicial bad faith. But the defenses of legal
fictions, most of which date to the 1980s, have had difficulty doing justice to the
1" Mitchell, supra note 96, at 253.
o Examples described by Mitchell include imputing an act to someone who did not perform it and
deeming an act to have occurred in a particular location or at a particular time. Id. at 255.
'0s See FULLER, supra note 99, at 130.
" See id. This category Fuller further subdivided into "exploratory fictions," which let judges "feel
their way incrementally toward some new legal principle or theory," and "abbreviatory fictions," used
primarily "for the purpose of expounding legal doctrine already in existence," among which Fuller
included the concepts of corporate personhood and constructive notice. Id. at 81; L.L. Fuller, Legal
Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 528, 537 (1930). Hans Vaihinger, Fuller's inspiration on this point,
called these "theoretical fictions." HANS VAIHINGER, supra note 102, at 111. On Vaihinger's influence
on Fuller, see Karen Petroski, Legal Fictions and the Limits ofLegal Language, 9 INT'LJ. L. CONTEXT
485, 489-91 (2013).
11 See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1990) (focusing on a particular example of a "dangerous legal fiction"); P.
Smith, supra note 36, at 1495; Lessons from Abroad, supra note 95, at 2249; cf Nancy J. Knauer, Legal
Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 20-23 (2010) (arguing that "empirical legal
errors"-assertions made by courts that are descriptively inaccurate-should not be considered legal
fictions because they do not fit Fuller's model).
... See Moglen, supra note 99, at 38 (arguing that because of common-law courts' responsibilities
with respect to the partitioning of factual and legal questions, "the legal fiction as a trope of
common-law thought is chronologically persistent"); R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U.
TORONTO L.J. 290, 290. 316-17 (1981); Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871,
915 (1986) ("In law, to work with words may mean to be caught continuously in the act of creating legal
fictions."). Olivier acknowledges this type of argument repeatedly but disagrees with it. See, e.g.,
OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 47 ("[T]he wide interpretation of the word fiction, to include all abstract
notions, ... must be rejected.... [T]he wide concept of fiction is based on a very naive concept of
reality.... If all abstract notions were fictions, the concept of reality, being an abstract notion, must
itself be a fiction, making it futile to argue about 'reality' or to classify some entities as 'real' and others as
'unreal' or 'fictitious'.").
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unambiguous connection we demand between legal discourse and actual life (a
demand exemplified by the work discussed in Part I.C). The orthodox approach to
legal fictions also fails to resolve, or to suggest a way to resolve, many of the puzzles
raised by the assumptions of omniscience described in Part I.
2. How Fictions of Omniscience Fit In.-The consensus framework for
discussing legal fictions does not do much to help us understand the assumptions of
omniscience described in Part I. Those assumptions do not seem to fit the classical
model; even if one selects just a single framework, assumptions of legislative
omniscience have a tendency to fall between categories, and these assumptions have
features that the classic account of fictions does not mention.5 2
For one thing, although judges very likely wield these assumptions with
awareness of their untruth, judges do not seem to make the assumptions in order to
adjust legal rules to unanticipated circumstances. Nor are the assumptions stand-ins
for facts that would otherwise be susceptible to processes of legal proof." Thus,
they are not "practical" fictions, to use Vaihinger's and Fuller's classification
scheme. And while commentators sometimes suggest that these assumptions, if
once useful, can now safely be discarded," 4 courts do not seem to conceive of the
assumptions as only temporarily useful. Yet assumptions of legislative omniscience
are not exactly "theoretical" fictions either, at least not as described by
commentators on statutory interpretation. 1' The standard position on theoretical
fictions, following Vaihinger, is that they are useful for analysis and discussion of
complex matters (akin to scientific and economic models).11 6 But commentators
112 Cf P. Smith, supra note 36, at 1461-63 (arguing that interpretive canons are based on "new"
legal fictions).
u1 See, e.g., Moglen & Pierce, supra note 14, at 1209 (explaining that classic "'legal fictions' operate
by .. . presuming the facts of lawsuits rather than by explicit amendment of the rules of law that would
otherwise apply. . .. ").
114 Professors Gluck and Bressman, for example, suggest that fictions underlying interpretive
practices might have arisen due to the immaturity of understandings of statutory interpretation: "One
way to understand the past seventy years of universalizing doctrinal and theoretical work [in the field of
statutory interpretation] is as the foundational work necessary to establish a field. Our findings raise the
possibility that the recent focus on legislation ... is only a temporary stop along the way to a more
nuanced ... understanding... .'" Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 17, at 800. See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1990) ("[A]n important
contribution of twentieth-century jurisprudence has been a measure of self-consciousness about the
existence of legal fictions, and an understanding that they are obstacles to thought. We do not need
interpretive fictions. Instead we need interpretive principles-ones that can be defended in substantive
or institutional terms."). Olivier also takes this position. See OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 107 ('A fiction
should be a symptom signalising an unsolved problem, and we should be prepared to solve that problem
and find the truth rather than to perpetuate the fiction.").
us They might be "theoretical fictions" as they are used by courts. Olivier describes "theoretical
fictions" as used not only by commentators but also by lawyers and judges. OLIVIER, supra note 100, at
156 ("All jurists ... practice legal science whenever they examine, analyse and explain the law.... I
regard a fiction as theoretical when it is used to analyse or explain the law. It is . . . not a fiction in law,
but a fiction concerning the law. It is often difficult to distinguish between practical and theoretical
fictions."). But applying this label to the assumptions does not explain the academic consensus regarding
their inappropriateness.
116 See, e.g., id. at 91-93.
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identify assumptions of legislative omniscience as inadequate premises for certain
interpretive practices. That is, commentators impute these assumptions to courts as
theoretical presuppositions that are inaccurate and therefore should not be
presupposed. The classic account of legal fictions makes it difficult to explain why
commentators persist in this imputation without cynically assuming that
commentators are, consciously or not, constructing a straw man to use in broader
critiques ofjudicial practice.
The standard account of legal fictions also does not provide much guidance on
how to handle the specific contrary-to-fact assumptions involved in fictions of
legislative omniscience. Is the key problem with these assumptions the imputation
of an impossible mental state, the imputation of that impossible mental state to an
inconceivable agent, the compounding of contrary-to-fact suppositions involved,
two or more of these problems, or something else entirely?"' Modern work on legal
fictions gives us no tools for addressing these questions (or those raised by the
analogous fictions described in Part III)."s
Avoiding all of these issues, commentators who call assumptions of omniscience
"fictions" have not generally linked their criticisms to the literature on legal fictions.
Rather, commentators seem to use the label for rhetorical effect. It allows them to
appeal to the accumulated connotations of the term "fiction" as referring to devices
that undermine law's search for the truth,"' that allow judges to assume a stance of
passivity,1 20 and that are not necessary in an enlightened legal system. 12 1 It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the label is inaccurate. Perhaps the mismatch
between the classic account of legal fictions and the ways these assumptions of
legislative omniscience operate stems from an inadequate conceptualization of legal
fictions themselves. Given that this conceptualization has not significantly changed
since the early twentieth century, it might well be susceptible to improvement.
B. Other Approaches to Fiction
The possibility that the classic approach to legal fictions might be deficient is
"' When they have acknowledged these different contrary-to-fact assumptions, commentators have
tended to treat them as all equally problematic (because all descriptively inaccurate) without further
analysis. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 19, at 234; P. Smith, supra note 36, at 1460-65.
us Medieval European commentators writing on legal fictions distinguished between fictions
concerning possible states of affairs and fictions concerning impossible states of affairs, and condemned
only the latter. See OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 15-16 (describing these positions); Ian Maclean, Legal
Fictions and Fictional Entities in Renaissance jurisprudence, LEGAL HIST., Dec. 1999, at 1, 9, 12.
Modern practice treats legal fictions as equally defensible or indefensible, whether or not the untrue
facts they posit are possible.
" See, e.g., P. Smith, supra note 36, at 1480-89 (discussing the value of judicial candor).
120 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17, at 778; OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 90 ("It
is argued that the use of fictions undermines respect for the law in as much as fictions portray it as being
devious and deceptive."); Lessons from Abroad, supra note 95, at 2233 ("[T]he legal fiction [is
traditionally characterized as] wield[ing] a deceptive power that allow[s] judges to assume a legislative
function.").
121 Lessons from Abroad, supra note 95, at 2232 (noting that in the nineteenth century, "[m]any
denounced the legal fiction as a crude and anachronistic device that had outlived its usefulness").
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supported by the fact that other disciplines have developed far more robust theories
of fiction over the past quarter century-almost entirely since the last wave of
scholarly defenses of legal fictions in the 1980s. With very few exceptions,1 22 no
recent writing on fictions for legal audiences has taken any account of this work.
This section examines some key features and conclusions from these other
disciplines.1 23
1. Philosophers on Fictional Utterances and Attitudes.-At least since the early
twentieth century, philosophers of language and mind have been debating the
status of the referents of fictional statements-most often, the question of whether
or not fictional characters exist, and if they do exist, in what sense.124 This question
is closely related to the question of whether statements that we know to be fictional
can nevertheless be said to be "true," and if so, in what sense. A puzzle addressed by
many writing in this tradition is the natural tendency most of us would have to say
that, for example, the sentence "Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street" is
true, even though it refers to a fictional character and his fictional residence.
As this summary suggests, most philosophers have focused on analyzing
individual fictional propositions, not entire fictional works.' 25 This focus seems
artificial when compared with our everyday experiences with fictional narratives,
but it makes the philosophical work easy to translate to the legal context, since legal
fictions in their classic form also take the form of propositions rather than extended
narratives. Philosophers exploring the "truth" of fictional statements have generally
agreed that any analysis requires distinguishing three different types of statements
about fictional entities.'26 One type of statement is the kind exemplified in the
122 See generally, e.g., Gawthorne, supra note 98 (discussed at more length infra note 132); Simon
Stern, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 364 (2013);
Stolzenberg, supra note 96.
123 Major works discussing the features and conclusions of theories of fiction over the past quarter
century include, but are not limited to: BRIAN BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES: EVOLUTION,
COGNITION, AND FICTION (2009); GREGORY CURRIE, THE NATURE OF FICTION (1990); SHAUN
NICHOLS & STEPHEN P. STICH, MINDREADING: AN INTEGRATED AccouNT OF PRETENCE,
SELF-AWARENESS, AND UNDERSTANDING OTHER MINDS (2003); AMIE L. THOMASSON, FICTION
AND METAPHYSICS (1999); KENDALL L. WALTON, MIMESIS AS MAKE-BELIEVE: ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL ARTS (1990); LISA ZUNSHINE, WHY WE READ
FICTION: THEORY OF MIND AND THE NOVEL (2006).
124 The origins of this debate are usually traced to Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479,
485-93 (1905) and the turn-of-the-century work of ALEXIUS MEINONG, OBER
GEGENSTANDSTHEORIE SELBSTDARSTELLUNG (1988). See generally CHARLES CRITTENDEN,
UNREALITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF FICTIONAL OBJECTS (1991) (discussing the existence of and
uses for fictional objects); Fred Kroon & Alberto Voltolini, Fiction, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(July 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fiction (addressing the debate between Meinong and
Russell and examining the different roles fictional entities play in discourse).
125 The work of Stacie Friend is critical of this tendency. See Stacie Friend, Fictive Utterance and
Imagining II, 85 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 163, 175 (2011) ("[W]e should consider, not
how the parts of the work add up to the whole, but instead how the whole work is embedded in a larger
context: in particular, the practices of reading, writing, publishing, and so on.").
126 See CURRIE, supra note 123, at 30-33.
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previous paragraph, which Gregory Currie has called a "fictive" utterance.127 A
second is a statement that compares fictional entities across fictions, such as
"Sherlock Holmes was more of a tortured genius than Hercule Poirot." Currie calls
these "transfictive" utterances.' 8 The third is the type of statement that comments
on a fiction's relation to reality: "Sherlock Holmes was a great fictional character" is
an example of such a "metafictive" utterance.1 29
Perhaps the most obvious features of these examples are that (1) it seems
reasonable to say that each could be evaluated for its truth or falsity, and
(2) evaluating the truth or falsity of each must be done from within a different
frame of reference-the fictional narratives of Conan Doyle for the first, fictive
utterance; the narratives of Conan Doyle plus those of Christie for the transfictive
utterance; and the world in which Conan Doyle and Christie wrote their narratives
(and in which the narratives are read) for the metafictive utterance. Philosophers
have proposed a number of ways of evaluating the truth of these different types of
statements. 30 What is important for purposes of this Article is simply the
observation that statements referring to fictional things and people are not all of
the same kind, and that the different kinds involved do not correspond to those
typically proposed by writers on legal fictions. This observation in turn suggests the
possibility of augmenting the classic legal account by considering the internal logic
of particular legal fictions and those fictions' relations to one another, as well as the
multiple frames of reference within which they are used.
A second major theme in philosophical work on fiction concerns the necessity
of considering the attitudes of those making and responding to fictional statements.
Many philosophers discuss this issue in terms of "pretense," following influential
early accounts by John Searle and David Lewis.' An especially popular account
along similar lines, one that has been taken up by many non-philosophers, is
Kendall Walton's account of fiction as "make-believe." Walton describes fictional
127 See id. at 31-32.
128 See id. at 171-72.
129 See id. at 158-62.
130 The standard account for fictive utterances is that of David Lewis, who proposed that their truth
could be assessed by reading them as "prefixed" by phrases situating them within particular discursive
contexts. David Lewis, Truth in Fiction, 15 AM. PHIL. Q 37, 37-38 (1978). For example, we would
normally evaluate the truth of a statement like "Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street" by asking whether a
human being by that name did live on a real street with that name. Lewis proposed that we could
evaluate the truth of this particular sentence by reference to the fiction in which the Sherlock Holmes
character appears, for example by (perhaps silently) recasting the statement to read, "In Conan Doyle's
stories about Sherlock Holmes, Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street," and then evaluating its truth by
reference to the content of Conan Doyle's stories, not living human beings or actual streets. This
approach allows us to say that the statement "Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street" is true, even though it
does not refer to any actual human being, a result consistent with our habits of thinking and speaking
about fictional propositions. This is only one element of Lewis's approach, but it is the most widely
accepted element.
.1 In a 1975 essay, Searle argued that making a fictive utterance involves "pretending" to assert
something. John R. Searle, The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse, 6 NEW LITERARY HIST. 319,
325-26 (1975). Lewis agreed that "[s]torytelling [i.e., the making of statements about fictional people,
places, and things] is pretence." Lewis, supra note 130, at 40.
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works as "props" akin to those used by children in (non-deceptive) games of
pretend. 132 just as children may make believe that, for example, a banana is a
telephone and generate additional imaginary propositions and behavior on the basis
of their attitude toward that "prop," older individuals use fictional narratives and
other representational artifacts (including, perhaps, such things as judicial opinions
and scholarly articles) as props in more complex and consequential games of
make-believe. Walton, unlike many other theorists of fiction, argues passionately
for fiction's generative power. He stresses the capacity of fictional "props" to open
up new possibilities for thought and action. (Of course, the thought and action
such artifacts make possible is not always normatively desirable, but this is a
distinct point.) Walton's generally positive account of fiction is an unusual
approach within philosophy but has proven attractive to scholars in other fields
seeking to understand the generation and use of fictional statements.'
2. Cognitive Scientists on Fiction, Mindreading, and Metacognition.-Among
the disciplines influenced by Walton's make-believe theory are psychology and
cognitive science.134 Many areas of recent psychological research relate to issues
studied under the fiction" rubric in other fields, including investigations of play and
non-deceptive pretense in children, investigations of empathy and "mindreading"
(described further below), 3 s and investigations of metacognition. 36
As the above brief discussion of Walton's work suggested, the play behavior
that children widely and spontaneously exhibit shares several features with adult
games of "make-believe," including the generation and appreciation of fictional
representations in various media. Cognitive scientists have added to this
observation findings on the close relationship between children's pretense behavior
and their ability to engage in mindreading (the attribution of desires, beliefs, and
intentions to others), as well as the prediction of behavior and the experience of
132 SeeWALTON, supra note 123, at 69.
133 Law is an exception. A recent article by David Gawthorne is one of the only attempts by a legal
scholar to engage seriously with recent philosophical approaches to fiction. Gawthorne, supra note 98, at
52. Gawthorne argues that philosophical fictionalism can ground a more satisfactory jurisprudence than
traditional positivist and natural-law positions. Id. Fictionalism is the position that fictional referents
have value, but not truth value. See R. M. SAINSBURY, FICTION AND FICTIONALISM 152 (2010).
According to Gawthorne, "[f]ictionalising social ontology remains the only principled approach to
explaining our fantastic powers over institutional things," such as law. Gawthorne, supra note 98, at 58.
Gawthorne does not address particular legal fictions at any length, but focuses on legal discourse as a
whole as fictional: "It is suggested, both that there is a human capacity to maintain such a robust
fictional discourse of law and that this describes what actually occurs to varying degrees in modern
societies." Id. at 72.
134 See Alan Richardson, Defaulting to Fiction: Neuroscience Rediscovers the Romantic
Imagination, 32 POETICS TODAY 663, 663-64 (2011) ("[A]t the beginning of the twenty-first century,
imagination suddenly became a term to conjure with in the sciences of brain and mind.").
13s See generally NICHOLS & STICH, supra note 123 (discussing studies of fiction as they relate to
investigations of empathy and mindreading).
13. See, e.g., METACOGNITION: KNOWING ABOUT KNOWING (Janet Metcalfe & Arthur P.
Shimamura eds., 1994) (discussing the psychological research relating to investigations of
metacognition).
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empathy.' 3 Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, reviewing much of the research in
this area, have proposed that a single set of cognitive mechanisms accounts for our
abilities to pretend, to attribute mental states to others, and to detect and report on
our own mental states, including our perceptions, beliefs, and inferences from these
beliefs. "' These mechanisms-partly innate, and partly developed through
interactions with other individuals and artifacts-allow us to navigate complex
social situations, to coordinate behavior, to trust others, and to develop many
further specialized cognitive and behavioral skills. Notably, and perhaps
counterintuitively, psychologists have found that we use these same mechanisms to
"read" the "minds" of (i.e., impute mental states to) non-human "characters," like
geometrical shapes, if they are placed in rudimentary narrative contexts.139
Our ability to detect and report our own mental states, or our thinking and
reasoning about our own thinking and reasoning, is sometimes labeled
"metacognition." One aspect of metacognition not yet touched on but relevant to
the philosophical debates about fiction, as well as to understanding legal fictions, is
the skill known as "source monitoring," the ability to "tag" our beliefs according to
the sources from which we learned them.1 40 Our general comfort with source
monitoring explains the ease with which we comprehend the differences between
the kinds of fictive utterances identified by Currie, as well as our virtually automatic
processing of information from a wide variety of sources in everyday life. Among
other things, source monitoring allows us to adjust our degree of commitment to
various propositions or beliefs. We might, for example, be willing to act on a
friend's assertion that it is raining by dressing appropriately without being willing
"' Work on the processes of reader identification with characters explores the tendency of readers
to take up an "internal perspective" when reading narratives, "even when the narrative does not specify
any particular perspective" for the reader to assume. Amy Coplan, Empathic Engagement with
Narrative Fiction, 62 J. OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 141, 142 (2004). From such observations,
researchers have inferred that reading fictional narratives helps readers develop "theory of mind"-an
understanding that others' mental states differ from one's own-and to parse social situations in terms
of individuals' motivation and expectations. See, e.g., Raymond A. Mar & Keith Oatley, The Function
of Fiction is the Abstraction and Simulation of Social Experience, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCl. 173,
173 (2008) ("[C]arefully crafted literary stories are not flawed empirical accounts, but are ... simulations
of selves in the social world. . . . The function of fiction can thus be seen to include the recording,
abstraction, and communication of complex social information in a manner that offers personal
enactments of experience, rendering it more comprehensible than usual."); see also David Comer Kidd
& Emanuele Castano, Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind, 342 SCI. 377, 377 (2013).
The psychological work on reader identification with fictional characters has also been influential in
recent literary scholarship.
13 See generally NICHOLS & STICH, supra note 123 (advancing the proposal that a single set of
cognitive mechanisms is responsible for our abilities to pretend and to attribute mental states).
139 Mar & Oadey, supra note 137, at 179 (citing, inter alia, G. Abell, F. Happ6, & U. Frith, Do
Triangles Play Tricks? Attribution of Mental States to Animated Shapes in Normal and Abnormal
Development, 15 COGNITIVE DEV. 1 (2000)) (noting studies that have shown "that humans
spontaneously ascribe intentional states to even simple circles and triangles when they move in ways that
look like chasing, fighting, and so on"); see also Daniel Schwarz, Character and Characterization: An
Inquiry, 19 J. OF NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE 85, 90 (1989) (arguing that anthropomorphizing betrays an
interest in human motivation and other minds).
14 See Marcia K. Johnson, Shahin Hashtroudi, & D. Stephen Lindsay, Source Monitoring, 114
PSYCH. BULLETIN 3, 3, 11-14 (1993) (describing functions of source monitoring).
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to say that we have a firm belief that it is in fact raining. Source monitoring is
important not only to general social functioning but also to many areas of
specialized activity, such as legal practice.14
These paragraphs have only scratched the surface of the vast psychological
literature on the workings of imagination, pretense, and fiction. The overall theme
of this literature, however, is remarkably uniform. According to psychologists,
pretense, fiction writing, and fiction reading are independently valuable activities.
They are not evasions of real-life experience, but useful additions to and tools for
enhancing it. This generally positive attitude toward pretending and fiction in
recent cognitive science has made that work especially attractive to scholars of
literary fiction seeking new ways to explain the value of the artifacts they study and
the legitimacy of studying them.
3. Literary Scholars on the Elements and Significance of Omniscience-Since
the turn of the twenty-first century, literary scholars have increasingly incorporated
psychological (and, to a lesser extent, philosophical) approaches into their work.
Cognitive scientists' findings have allowed literary scholars to argue that the
activities of reading and writing fiction develop important capacities, including
theory of mind 42 and metacognitive skills,14 3 as well as empathyl 4 4 and the notion
141 Andrew Elfenbein has argued that expert reading allows a kind of "offline" processing of routine
components of text, which then become invisible to the reader, while enabling more sophisticated
processing of other textual components. Andrew Elfenbein, Cognitive Science and the History of
Reading, 121 PMLA 484, 485 (2006) ("The very expertise of literary critics may render [some] aspects
[of reading] invisible because their skills have become so routinized. Far from leading to shallow or
superficial results, such routinization enables sophisticated . .. readings . . . ."). Expert reading practices
that involve the differentiation and juggling of multiple sources may make the metacognitive workout
that reading provides more intense and effective. Id. at 498 ("The discipline of literary criticism fosters
metacognitive abilities by engaging with a remarkably wide range of texts ... which encourage the
development of varied reading strategies.").
142 ZUNSHINE, supra note 123, at 17-18, for example, argues generally that reading fiction is a way
to practice mindreading skills. Similarly, BOYD, supra note 123, at 15, 49, describes art, including
fiction, as a form of "cognitive play" that "speed[s] up our capacity to process patterns of social
information [and] to make inferences from other minds." See also H. Porter Abbott, Reading Intended
Meaning Where None Is Intended: A Cognitivist Reappraisal of the Implied Author, 32 POETICS
TODAY 461, 465, 467 (2011) (noting how personification of an implied author meshes with "the
illusion of wholeness that our 'folk psychology' regularly confers upon the communicating self");
Schwarz, supra note 139, at 90, 92, 100, 104 (arguing that characterization implies an interpersonal or
transpersonal attitude and offers training in theory of mind); Murray Smith, On the Twofoldness of
Character, 42 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 277, 277 (2011) ("[jW]e can and do respond to [literary]
characters in ways that parallel our responses to real individuals . . . .").
143 See Vanessa L. Ryan, Reading the Mind: From George Eliot's Fiction to James Sully's
Psychology, 70 J. HISTORY IDEAS 615, 615-17 (2009) (describing how accounts of the value of reading
fiction by nineteenth-century psychologist James Sully anticipated contemporary cognitive science);
Smith, supra note 142, at 279-81, 283, 291 (discussing how perceptions of character involve twofold
recognition of a represented "person" and of the constructed or "configurational" aspect of the
representation).
" Empathy with characters is the chief mechanism by which fiction reading is thought to develop
theory-of-mind capacities. See, e.g., SUZANNE KEEN, EMPATHY AND THE NOVEL (2007) (analyzing
the "comprehensive account of the relationships among novel reading, empathy, and altruism"); Richard
Walsh, Why We Wept for Little Nell: Character and Emotional Involvement, 5 NARRATIVE 306, 313
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of objective truth.'45 Two lines of inquiry in literary scholarship relevant to the
subject of this Article have received less attention in philosophy and cognitive
science: the fictional representation of impossible scenarioS146 and the type of
impossible representation we call "omniscience."
One useful addition made by literary scholarship to the philosophical and the
psychological work on fiction is the insight that verisimilitude makes less difference
than one might expect to the experience of reading fiction.147 A fantastic narrative,
just like a realistic narrative, can be analyzed and deliver benefits in all of the ways
described above. 148 It is just as easy for readers to empathize with characters
presented by omniscient third-person narrators as it is for them to empathize with
first-person narrators.1 49 Readers can empathize with, and attribute intention to,
fictional figures that do not resemble themselves-even "characters" that are not
purporting to be human.150
A classic impossible device in Western literary fiction is what we have come to
call the omniscient third-person narrator: the narrator who tells us not only what
the characters in the narrative did, but also what was going on in their fictional
minds.15 ' In an important 2004 essay that sparked an extended debate, Jonathan
(1997) (arguing that our emotional response to real people is analogous to our emotional response to
fictional characters).
145 See Rebecca Goldstein, The Fiction of the Self and the Self of Fiction, 47 MASS. REv. 293,
298-99 (2006) (arguing that practice in identifying with fictional points of view trains us in assuming
the attitude necessary to conceive of transpersonal and interpersonal truths).
146 Philosophers have tended to view "impossible" fictions as deviant forms of reference. See Diane
Proudfoot, Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction, 35 J. PHIL. LOGIC 9, 31-32 (2006) (observing that
"many philosophers take the view that impossible fictions are peculiar or non-standard[,]" but that
"[u]nfortunately for this view, many fictions are impossible fictions") (emphasis omitted). What is
conventionally called "omniscient narration," Proudfoot notes, is impossible in this sense: "Many
nineteenth-century European and American novels contain descriptions of the undisclosed thoughts of
the characters and so are paradigmatic cases of impossible fiction." Id. at 33.
147 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 134, at 666-67 (noting the prevalence of "impossibilities" in
fiction and observing that "virtually every known human culture features popular oral tales and myths
that indulge in similar impossibilities" to those found in contemporary American popular culture, such
as the TWILIGHT series and the movie Avatar).
148 See Rick Busselle & Helena Bilandzic, Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing
Stories: A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement, 18 COMM. THEORY 255, 256, 258,
260, 266, 269-71 (2008) (making this point and noting the impossible components of many otherwise
realistic, or internally coherent, genre narratives, such as crime dramas, mystery, and science fiction).
149 Suzanne Keen, Readers' Temperaments and Fictional Character, 42 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
295, 297 (2011).
"s See id. at 302.
.s. See, e.g., Paisley Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli, Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional
Characters, 42 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 337, 354 (2011) (describing such a narrator as an "impossible
agent"). Brian Boyd argues that fictional figures that possess omniscience, such as deities, serve a
social-control function by causing us to postulate a figure that can see into our minds. BOYD, supra note
123, at 204-05. Similarly, in his 2004 essay, Jonathan Culler notes that the idea of omniscient narration
seems to have arisen from "the frequently articulated analogy between God and the author" of a work of
fiction, but Culler contends that we should understand the analogy the other way around. that is, "the
example of the novelist, who creates his world ... helps us to imagine the possibility of a creator, a god,
a sentient being, as undetectable to us as the novelist would be to the characters who exist in the
universe of the text this god created." Culler, supra note 12, at 23.
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Culler argued that this label is a misnomer, and his analysis informed some of the
distinctions made earlier in this Article. 152 Professor Culler considered
"omniscience" an imprecise label for narratorial features, since it "conflates and
confuses several different factors" present in so-called omniscient narration. 5 3
According to Professor Culler, these factors include "(1) the performative
authoritativeness of many narrative declarations, which seem to bring into being
what they describe; (2) the reporting of innermost thoughts and feelings, such as
are usually inaccessible to human observers"; (3) narrators' occasional "flaunt[ing]"
of their "godlike ability to determine how things turn out"; and "(4) the synoptic
impersonal narration of the realist tradition," or the selective filtering of relevant
information by conventional omniscient narrators. 15 4 Professor Culler surmised that
the second of these functions is responsible for the conventional "omniscience"
label.'s When we read about what characters are thinking from an apparently
external perspective, he suggested, we are inclined to "invent a person to be the
source of textual details, but since this knowledge is not that which an ordinary
person could have, we must imagine this invented person to be godlike,
omniscient.""
Professor Culler's broader conclusions in this essay have not been widely
accepted, perhaps because they are difficult to reconcile with the kinds of
psychological findings discussed in the previous Part. Professor Culler also did not
succeed in getting critics to abandon the "omniscient narrator" term.1 57 Still, his
breakdown of the various features of omniscient narration is a useful analytical tool.
Although Professor Culler and his interlocutors were discussing literary narratives,
many of their observations seem to describe legal discourse just as accurately. The
functions performed by omniscient narrators, in particular, are strikingly similar to
those performed by the classic judicial "narrator," the voice operating in the
conventional judicial opinion. 15s That voice likewise "bring[s] into being" legal
relations; "report[s]" thoughts (both those mental states relevant to legal
152 See Culler, supra note 12, at 22-24. Responses to this essay included William Nelles,
Omniscience for Atheists: Or, Jane Austen's Infallible Narrator, 14 J. SOC'Y FOR STUDY NARRATIVE
LITERATURE 118, 120 (2006); Barbara K. Olson, "Who Thinks This Book?" Or Why the Author/God
Analogy Merits Our Continued Attention, 14 J. SOC'Y FOR STUDY NARRATIVE LITERATURE 339
(2006); Meir Sternberg, Omniscience in Narrative Construction: Old Challenges and New, 28
POETICS TODAY 683 (2007). See also Jonathan Culler, Knowing or Creating? A Response to Barbara
Olson, 14 J. SOC'Y FOR STUDY NARRATIVE LITERATURE 347 (2006).
1s3 Culler, supra note 12, at 22.
154 Id. at 26.
s Id. at 28.
u5 Id. Culler suggested, following Nicholas Royle, that we use the term "telepathy" rather than
"omniscience" to refer to the phenomenon of inside views of characters' minds. Id. at 29 (citing and
discussing NICHOLAS ROYLE, THE UNCANNY 261 (2003)).
17 See, e.g., Paul Dawson, The Return of Omniscience in Contemporary Fiction, 17 NARRATIVE
143, 149 (2009).
158 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW 240-41 (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 101-02 (1990); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as
Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 205-07 (1990).
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determinations and others, like the "mental state" of a legislature); sometimes
"flaunt[s]" its ability to "determine how things [will] turn out"; and selectively
filters relevant information."s9 Lawyers and other judges reading such opinions are
thus in a position analogous to that taken by the readers of novels with omniscient
narrators. Moreover, within those opinions, judicial narrators present themselves as
the readers of yet another authorial performance, that of the legislature. When
judges impute omniscience to this author of the law, they are acknowledging its
role as the law's creator and the meaningfulness of its creations.
4. Preliminary Implications for Understanding Fictions of Omniscience.-
Legal scholarship has been virtually oblivious to the work discussed in this Part.
The above sketch has focused on some concepts important to that work, but absent
from the legal scholarship on fictions. These concepts include the importance of
clarifying the frames of reference, or "worlds," within which fictional statements are
made, in assessing the truth value of those statements; the significance of particular
attitudes, both natural and conventional, in understanding and using fictional
statements; the possibility that fiction making and reading might be valuable
human activities rather than deviant or deceptive acts; and the central, rather than
subordinate, role of "impossible" fictions in providing this value.
In Part IV, I will return to these issues in more detail, building on the
information examined in Part III concerning other legal fictions of omniscience. It
is, however, possible at this point to suggest some adjustments to the classic
account of legal fictions that advance our understanding of assumptions of
legislative omniscience. Legal doctrines that presuppose deliberate action and
expressions of will (like the "faithful-agent" construct) all require us to make
inferences about the "minds" of others. These inferences are like what cognitive
scientists call mindreading. In everyday life, we develop the ability to draw such
inferences by imagining states of mind in both real and fictional people.6 o The
legal postulation of such "minds" is closely analogous to their narrative postulation.
In both spheres, such postulations involve the generation of props for use in
readers' games of make-believe that such "minds" exist and have contents different
from the readers' own. Both statutes and the (implicitly or explicitly) personified
legislature can be understood as props of this kind. Perhaps, then, fictions of
legislative omniscience, when asserted by judges, both enable and remind those
whose practices rely on the meaningfulness of legislative output (such as lawyers
and judges) to make certain imaginative, but perfectly everyday, leaps outside their
own minds.
159 Culler, supra note 13, at 26. Regarding the performance of these functions by judicial narrators,
in addition to the sources cited in the previous note, see Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601, 1615 (1986) (focusing on the non-judicial "audience" for these performances, rather
than on the audience made up of other judges and lawyers).
1"o See Suzanne Keen, A Theory of Narrative Empathy, 14 NARRATIVE 207, 219 (2006) (citing
and discussing David S. Miall's theories, works, and studies).
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III. OTHER FICTIONS OF OMNISCIENCE
This Part addresses some fictions of omniscience in other areas of law. It starts
with the group of fictions involving the imputation of knowledge from one
individual to others in joint undertakings such as principal-agent relationships,
some corporate contexts, and some criminal conspiracies. In many circumstances,
the law deems such individuals to be, as it were, telepathically connected, sharing
one another's mental states. In some respects, these doctrines are the closest
relatives of fictions of legislative omniscience; like those fictions, these doctrines
operate in several areas and rarely receive critical scrutiny by judges.
Similar devices in two other contexts have received significantly more attention:
the controversial fiction imputing knowledge of the criminal law to criminal
defendants (making unavailable to them the defense of ignorance or mistake of
law), and the less controversial fiction of the "person having ordinary skill in the
art," a construct unique to patent law but sharing several features with the
assumptions discussed in Part I.16"
A. Constructive Notice of Information Known to Others
1. Scope and Function.-Doctrines of constructive or imputed notice are deeply
rooted in many areas of law yet seldom receive direct attention. The most
comprehensive scholarly treatment of these principles remains an 1883 article by
William L. Scott in the American Law Review.1 62 Scott addressed five kinds of
constructive notice: constructive notice of registered property documents,
constructive notice under the doctrine of lis pendens, constructive notice arising out
of actual notice (the familiar idea of being "on notice"), constructive notice arising
out of willful blindness, and a principal's constructive notice of matters known to
his or her agent.1 63 The first three of these forms of constructive notice, in some
ways, resemble assumptions of legislative omniscience more than the last two, as
they involve imputed knowledge of available and legally relevant information. But
as Scott explains, these forms of constructive notice are theoretically unproblematic;
161 Space does not permit discussion of a number of other ways in which the law imputes impossible
or unlikely knowledge to real or fictional actors. One example of such a doctrine is the
fraud-on-the-market theory used in securities law. See, e.g., Randy D. Gordon, Fictitious Fraud:
Economics and the Presumption of Reliance, 9 INT'LJ. L. CONTEXT 506, 509-511 (2013); P. Smith,
supra note 36, at 1455-57. Another example is the reasonable person. See MAYO MORAN,
RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
OBJECTIVE STANDARD (2003).
162 William L. Scott, Constructive Notice, Its Nature and Limitations, 17 AM. L. REV. 849 (1883).
Although commentators on statutory interpretation have characterized implied legislative intent as a
kind of "constructive" intent, there appear to have been no extended studies of the conceptual
relationship between constructive legislative knowledge and doctrines of constructive knowledge in
other areas of law. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273,
281-82 (2011).
163 Scott, supra note 162, at 859-63, 882-83; see also The Doctrine of Constructive Notice, 4 L.
COACH 157, 157-58 (1924) (outlining similar list and stating that "[ijmputed knowledge is what one's
agents know").
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they can be explained as restatements of a legal duty to inform oneself of relevant
information before taking action.164
Knowledge imputed from an agent to his or her principal seems different.
Usually, principals enlist agents so that the principals do not need to learn all that
the agents learn. The law condones this use of agents, so it would be inconsistent
for the law to impose on the principal a duty to learn all the agent knows. Why
impute the agent's knowledge to the principal, then? Scott spends most of his
article16 s on this form of imputed knowledge, which has become the model for
many similar forms of imputation to be discussed shortly. Scott's conclusion is that
this form of constructive notice can be justified only (1) as a way to protect
innocent third parties,16 and (2) more basically, as grounded in a principle of
substitution, or legal identification, between principal and agent.16 1
As Scott recognized, this far more fictional-seeming conception of constructive
knowledge was easy to extend to larger principal-agent-style relationships, like
those involved in corporations.' 6 ' This concept has been extended to other less
formalized kinds of legally recognized joint action as well. Examples include the
following:
In some scenarios of vicarious liability, information
known to, or the state of mind of, an employee will be
imputed to the employer contrary to fact.'
1" See, e.g., Scott, supra note 162, at 860; see also Rudolf Callmann, Constructive Notice and
Laches: A Study on the Nature of Legal Concepts, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 395, 396 (1952) (making a
similar point with respect to imputation to trademark registrants of knowledge of previously registered
trademarks). These forms of constructive notice also impute to an actor knowledge of information that
is generally possible to acquire, so holding actors responsible for acquiring it does not seem unrealistic.
Similarly, constructive notice based on willful blindness is imputed knowledge of facts that would have
been known had the actor not dosed his or her eyes to them, not facts that would have taken any
unusual effort to learn.
165 Scott devotes eighteen out of forty-two pages to this topic, far more space than he spends on any
other variety of constructive notice. Scott, supra note 162, at 864-82.
16 Id. at 858.
"' Id. at 871 ("[Ilt would seem that the theory of legal identifications,-of alter ego,-that by
intendment of the law the principal is present in the transaction in the person of his agent, the agent's
act being his act, and the agent's knowledge his knowledge, is the more logical and consistent ground
upon which to rest the doctrine in all classes of agency.").
1s See id. at 890-91 (discussing this extension). Corporate personality may be the earliest legal
fiction (treated as such by medieval European commentators) that we still recognize in a similar form.
See OLIVIER, supra note 100, at 17 (discussing treatment of corporate personality by canonists). As a
number of commentators have noted, the fiction of corporate personality has significant analogies to the
notion of legislative intent. See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazibal, The Locus of
Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 81, 104-05 (2006) (noting parallels between notions of
legislative intent and corporate responsibility, as well as orthodox conceptions of the group intentionality
of juries and appellate panels). Professor Radin famously criticized legislative intent as a fiction. Radin,
supra note 33, at 870. His contemporary Felix Cohen criticized corporate agency along similar lines in
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809-14 (1935).
169 See Abril & Olazibal, supra note 168, at 113 ("If a rogue employee commits a crime
unbeknownst to and without the direct or indirect encouragement of his superiors, and ... benefits his
employer, the employer may be liable for the employee's actions.").
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In prosecutions of individuals for criminal conspiracy,
the conspiratorial group's "intention" may be attributed
to each individual, regardless of proof of that
individual's actual mental state, for purposes of
establishing the criminal liability of that individual. 70 A
defendant to a conspiracy charge need not have actual
knowledge of "all its details" or all the participants in the
conspiracy to be convicted."'
Similarly, under so-called Pinkerton liability, a criminal
defendant can be held individually liable for crimes
committed by his or her co-conspirators, despite lacking
knowledge and the mental state required for a
freestanding conviction, as long as the defendant agreed
to the group's aims and the separate crime bore some
general causal relation to the conspiracy. 172
* In the criminal prosecution of a corporation, the
knowledge of corporate employees may, under some
circumstances, be aggregated to establish the mens rea
required to convict the corporation, so that the
corporation as a whole may be said to "know" the facts
making its conduct illegal, even though no single
employee had such knowledge.17 3
* By extension, in actions under the federal securities
statutes, the knowledge of directors, officers, and
employees-and perhaps even of those outside the
corporation-may be imputed to a corporation to
17 See Jens David Ohlin, Group Think The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 152-53 (2007) ("[B]y virtue of the criminal agreement, the act and
intentions of one become the act and intentions of the other . . . .").
17 See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947).
172 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946); see also United States v. Alvarez, 755
F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985); Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional
Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 618-19 (2008) (citing United States v.
Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1991)) (noting that at least one court has held that "a
defendant could be vicariously liable for substantive crimes that were committed before he even joined
the conspiracy. . . .").
3 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cit. 1987); Abril &
Olazibal, supra note 168, at 86 (describing this approach); see generally Thomas A. Hagemann &
Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 210 (1997). Hagemann and Grinstein are critical of this doctrine; they contend that
only commentators, not courts, have approved conviction based on the aggregation of such knowledge
absent a showing of "willful blindness" on the part of the organization. See id. at 211, 227.
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establish the scienter required for the corporation's
liability.174
Some other, slightly more exotic, extensions of the principle include the
following:
* In strict products liability, knowledge of a product's
dangers available at the time of litigation is imputed to
the manufacturer as of the time of manufacture. 17s
* For Fourth Amendment purposes, knowledge supplying
probable cause to search or arrest that is held by one
member of a police force may be deemed held by those
other members who actually carry out the search or
arrest.176
Some of these variants depart more from the basic principal-agent scenario than
others. The most straightforward extensions impute knowledge or a mental state
from an employee to an individual employer or from one criminal co-venturer to
another."' When knowledge or a state of mind is imputed to a group rather than
an individual, the doctrine involves not only a kind of thought transference but also
personification of something that does not possess a mind in the ordinary sense.
Not surprisingly, commentary and controversy have focused more on these latter
scenarios than on the simpler ones. 78 The final two examples above seem even
174 City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Syst. v. Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468, 506 (6th Cir. 2004), as
amended by City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Syst. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005)
(applying this approach); Abril & Olazibal, supra note 168, at 153-54 ("When a major corporate
event . .. is a part of the public record or has been highly publicized, a corporation should be deemed to
'know' it for purposes of proving the corporation's scienter.").
175 See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability:
The Empire Strikes Back 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1992) ("Many courts ... impute[] the
knowledge of the product's danger available at the time of trial to the manufacturer as of the time of the
product's manufacture.").
16 See Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2007) [hereinafter Stern, Constructive] (citing
and discussing United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032 (8th Cit. 2001)). Stern describes the typical
operation of what he calls the "constructive-knowledge rule" as follows: "[S]everal officers are
investigating a crime, none personally has probable cause, one of them conducts a search or arrest
anyway, and the court lets in the evidence on the theory that the officers knew enough in the aggregate
to support probable cause." Id.
" On the latter point, see Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609,
617-20, 624, 634-35 (1984) (discussing imputed culpability, i.e., state of mind, in doctrines of
complicity and vicarious liability, as well as felony murder, as analogous in important respects).
1s See, e.g., Hagemann & Grimstein, supra note 173, at 210 (considering the potential problems
arising from aggregating individual knowledge to create a corporate state of mind); William S. Laufer &
Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1285, 1285-98 (2000) (describing the debate surrounding this theory and proposing a resolution);
Stern, Constructive, supra note 176, at 1085-89.
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more anomalous, for different reasons. In strict products liability, the knowledge in
question is not only being imputed to a non-human entity but also by definition
could not have been known to anyone, human or not, at the time it is deemed to
have been known. In the probable-cause scenario, the doctrine seems to supply
perverse incentives stifling actual information-sharing. The acceptability of these
two scenarios, despite their bizarre features, is probably due at least partly to the
remarkable solidity of the basic paradigm-the "identification" of one mind with
another that Scott describes with so little hesitation as an unproblematic legal
device.
2. Justiljdng Constructive Knowledge.-Why are these doctrines acceptable? At
one time, commentators had no hesitation in describing constructive notice
doctrines as "fictions,"' but that label is seldom applied to these areas of law any
longer. They appear now to be considered, in many forms, just ordinary legal rules.
The standard justifications for these principles fall into three general categories.
The first is more a matter of stipulation than justification: it is the simple identity
explanation that Scott offered.'s This explanation seems less useful, however, the
further one travels from the core principal-agent model.
Another set of explanations is normative. Constructive knowledge is sometimes
justified as necessary to protect innocent third parties ' or to hold culpable
actors-be they individuals or groups, such as corporations-responsible for the
effects of their actions. 182 Relatedly, constructive knowledge doctrines are
sometimes justified on a kind of deterrence rationale, harking back to Scott's
observation about constructive notice of legally relevant facts. The idea is that if a
beneficial result would follow from imposing a legal duty on a person to inform
him- or herself about the matters in question, then the law is justified in treating
that person as having so informed him or herself, regardless of the facts."s3
No one normative rationale, however, seems to fit each of the examples listed
above equally well.184 And some-notably the imputation of knowledge among
police officers for probable-cause purposes-appear to lack any good normative
.. See, e.g., VEPA P. SARATHI, V.K. VARADACHARI'S LEGAL FICTIONs 30, 33, 83 (2d ed. 2012).
.. See supra notes 167 and accompanying text.
is, See Scott, supra note 162, at 858.
182 See, e.g., Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112 (1916) ("If
th[e] employer is compelled to bear the burden of his servant's torts even when he is ... without fault, it
is because in a social distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance seems thereby to be
obtained."); Robinson, supra note 177, at 619 (describing responsibility as justification for imputed
criminal liability); Wertheimer, supra note 174, at 1209-10 (arguing that strict products liability,
without a state-of-the-art defense, is necessary for reasons similar to those offered by Professor Laski).
' See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 177, at 626, 658-59 (discussing deterrence rationale for doctrines
of vicarious criminal liability); Scott, supra note 162, at 860.
184 See, e.g., Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 173, at 240 (criticizing aggregation of mental
states within corporations for purposes of criminal liability). Hagemann and Grinstein acknowledge that
the doctrinal modification they propose-adding a willful blindness element-also involves imputing
information to actors. Id. at 246. ("[T]he willful blindness doctrine imputes to defendants knowledge
that they never actually acquired. The collective knowledge rule, on the other hand, takes knowledge
that does exist, albeit in separate locations, and accumulates it."). See also discussion infra Part III.B.
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justification. Indeed, the main justification for that doctrine seems to be
evidentiary. If the individual officers would eventually have shared the information
they each possessed, then the lawfulness of the search or arrest should not turn on
an accident of timing.18 5 An evidentiary rationale can be generated for the other
variations on the constructive-knowledge theme as well. In each case, we accept
imputing one actor's knowledge or mental state to another actor because it would
be too difficult or uncertain to confirm the presence or absence of that knowledge
or mental state in the actor to whom they are imputed. In the core principal-agent
scenario, it does not really matter whether the principal actually knew every detail
of what the agent did; determining whether the principal did know this is
gratuitous, given the principal's legal relationship to the agent. 1" Similarly,
co-conspirators might share intentions and knowledge to different degrees.
Determining the precise extent of their shared knowledge would consume at least
as much time as proving objective elements of the crimes in question, with no
assurance of a clear conclusion.' 7
The evidentiary perspective also helps to explain why we no longer consider at
least the more basic constructive-knowledge doctrines to involve legal fictions. In a
principal-agent relationship, the "facts" of the principal's mental state do not matter
beyond those necessary to establish the relationship. The law now defines such
facts as irrelevant. We accordingly have no basis for considering the law's approach
to these matters to be counterfactual or fictional. In this area, then, notions that
were once considered fictions have been so thoroughly absorbed into legal practice
and discourse that they have become just another way of establishing the premises
for a legal conclusion. Since this type of legal premise does not depend on the
presentation of evidence in the traditional sense, it does not displace or conflict
with the establishment of factual premises for a legal conclusion.
To explore this point further, the next part turns to a principle from criminal
law-the maxim "ignorance of the law is no defense"-that is sometimes described
as akin to constructive-knowledge doctrines.' This maxim, however, unlike the
doctrines discussed just above, is still often characterized as a fiction.
15 Cf Stern, Constructive, supra note 176, at 1115 (discussing possibility of justifying
constructive-knowledge doctrine by reference to inevitable-discovery doctrine). Despite presenting this
possibility, Stern does not endorse the doctrine, noting its asymmetrical application: "[The courts feel
most compelled to reject the idea of omniscience when there is a risk that imputing information to the
acting officer would make the officer liable for a civil rights violation." Id. at 1140.
"' Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch Some Soupmeat", 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209, 2218
(1995) (showing how any agent will need to "fill in the blanks" in a principal's directives).
' See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 177, at 620 n.31 ("The evidentiary theory is most often employed
to support imputation of mental rather than objective elements. One would expect such a pattern of
application since the evidentiary rationale responds to problems of proof, and proof of mental elements
is more difficult than proof of objective elements.").
..s Cf Douglas N. Husak, Varieties of Srict Liabilty, 8 CAN. J.L. &JURISPRUDENCE 189, 212
(1995) (discussing ignoranria maxim as variety of strict liability).
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B. The Legal Knowledge of the Criminal Defendant
1. Scope and Function-The maxim "ignorance of the law is no defense" refers
to the general denial to criminal defendants of the defense that they were not aware
that their conduct was against the law. In some formulations, the maxim looks like
a fiction, deeming the criminal defendant to know the law (and precluding
assertions to the contrary). While the legitimacy of equating the bar on this defense
with an imputation of knowledge to a defendant is problematic, the maxim remains
in wide use as a shorthand reference to the rule.1 89
The ignorance-of-the-law fiction is of very long standing, perhaps even longer
than the doctrines discussed in the previous section.' Unlike principal-agent
constructive notice, this fiction does not involve telepathy, rather, it imputes to the
defendant knowledge of publicly available information. In this respect, it is closer
kin to the recorded-tide and lis pendens forms of constructive notice, as well as to
some versions of the fiction of legislative omniscience.
Like fictions of legislative omniscience, and unlike many forms of constructive
notice, this fiction does not function as a direct premise for legal conclusions.
Rather, it is a way of justifying the rule denying defendants use of an
ignorance-of-law defense-but only sometimes. Exceptions to that bar have
probably always been recognized,1 9' most notably when it would have truly been
impossible for the defendant, or anyone in the defendant's position, to have known
of the law making conduct an offense (because, for example, that law had not yet
been made public). 92 Over the past few centuries, courts have permitted an
's' One early commentator, Jeremiah Smith, argued that the bar on the ignorance-of-the-law
defense could not be considered equivalent to an assumption about criminal defendants' knowledge.
Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions II, 3 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 24, 24-25 (1918) (quoting JOHN AUSTIN,
1 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 497 (3d ed. 1869) ("There is no such presumption [of the criminal
defendant's knowledge of the law].... It is a fiction. . . . That any actual system of law is knowable by
those who are bound to obey it 'is so notoriously and ridiculously false that I shall not occupy your time
with proof to the contrary.'"). The only justification needed for the substantive rule barring the defense,
Smith argued, is the impossibility of judging a defendant's claim to ignorance. Id. at 25.
" By some accounts, imputations of knowledge of the law to criminal defendants, regardless of
their actual states of knowledge, dates back to Roman law. See, e.g., Vera Bolgir, The Present Function
of the Maxim Ignorantia luris Neminem Excusat-A Comparative Study, 52 IOWA L. REV. 626, 627
(1967); Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 77-79
(1908). Other commentators date its origin to early English law. See Livingston Hall & Selig J.
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 643-45 (1941). Professor Smith has
identified it as a "new legal fiction." P. Smith, supra note 36, at 1459. Regardless of its exact age, the
principle has long been widely applied in Anglo-American law. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 46, at 344
n.9; Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 36-39 (1939);
Kenneth W. Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 489-90 (2012); Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392 (1986).
191 Some have argued that the principle has always been honored in the breach. See, e.g., Bolgir,
supra note 190, at 640-41 ("[F]rom the time the rule begins to appear in the courts of the United
States, . . . it was used more as a means for balancing considerations of equity than as a basis for strict
judicial interpretation.").
9 See, e.g., Hall & Seligman, supra note 190, at 657.
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ignorance-of-the-law defense in an increasing number of additional situations. 193
As the irregular application of the rule might suggest, the accompanying fiction
has been extensively analyzed. In fact, it is probably the most criticized of all
fictions discussed in this Article. The next section summarizes some themes of this
analysis.
2. Justifications for the Fiction.-There are two standard rationales for
imputing knowledge of the law to criminal defendants. One is evidentiary: allowing
the defense of ignorance-of-the-law would lead to irresolvable disputes over the
state of individual defendants' knowledge. 194 Prosecutors would have no
straightforward way to rebut a defendant's assertion of ignorance. 9 s Since some
assumptions need to be made to prove a defendant's state of mind in any event, it is
more efficient to assume a uniform state of knowledge on the defendant's part, one
that coincides with the collective state of knowledge of prosecutor, defense counsel,
and judge (if not the jury pool). The second rationale, a normative one often
attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes,'96 proposes that withholding the defense will
encourage members of the public to learn what the law requires and forbids. If
courts adhere to the rule, this argument goes, then the public will learn that
criminal defendants are deemed to know the law. This awareness will encourage
potential lawbreakers to inform themselves about the law, since they will know they
cannot use ignorance as a defense should they break the law and be prosecuted.197
Both rationales have been criticized. The most frequent criticism, like the
standard critiques of legislative omniscience, stresses the inaccuracy of the fiction as
... For a discussion of one notable context in which these exceptions have emerged, see Davies,
supra note 46, at 343 (discussing and criticizing the trend towards increasing exceptions to the
ignorantia legis principle). See also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146-49 (1994); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-204 (1991); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 393-98 (1933).
For commentary, see Hall & Seligman, supra note 190, at 642 ("There are now a number of exceptions
to the rule, and their creation and shaping is largely the product of American judicial decision since the
beginning of the nineteenth century."); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse: But Only
for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127, 150 (1997); Alexander P. Robbins, Comment, After Howard
and Monetta: Is Ignorance of the Law a Defense to Administrative Liability for Aiding and Abetting
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 299, 310-17 (2007) (arguing against
allowing the defense in this context); Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for
Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ L. REV. 221, 223 (1989) (criticizing trend toward allowing defense in tax crime
prosecutions); Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse (Killed
by Money, Drugs, and a Little Sex), 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 639-40 (1999)
[hereinafter Yochum, Death].
" See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 190, at 44 (noting that "recognition of [the] ignorance of
law ... defense would ... present to the jury 'questions incapable of solution').
"s See, e.g., Bolgir, supra note 190, at 627-28; Davies, supra note 46, at 353 n.53; John T. Parry,
Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 67 (1997); Perkins,
supra note 190, at 41, 44.
196 Davies, supra note 46, at 354; Parry, supra note 195, at 67.
... See Bolgir, supra note 190, at 655-56 ("[T]he necessity that laws must be known by responsible
and free citizens arose ... from the theory that citizens are responsible, that they are free, and that the
law in its enacted form ... should recognize this responsibility and respect this freedom." (emphasis in
original)).
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a description of defendants' actual states of knowledge. Given this inaccuracy,
critics contend, the imputation of legal knowledge to defendants is not a realistic
evidentiary presumption, so the evidentiary rationale is weak.' 98 Nor does the rule
seem to have been effective in encouraging lawful behavior, so the normative
rationale lacks support.'99 This double-barreled criticism may explain many of the
exceptions American courts have permitted. And it has probably strengthened over
time: as criminal laws multiply, the discrepancy between the knowledge that the
fiction imputes to any given criminal defendant and that defendant's actual
knowledge becomes greater,200 while the difficulty of proving the defendant's actual
knowledge presumably remains about the same, so the evidentiary presumption
becomes increasingly unsupportable, while the normative rationale becomes ever
more unrealistic. 20 1
So far, the arguments concerning this fiction seem to parallel some of those
made about fictions of legislative omniscience. But another contribution to this
literature has moved beyond this framing of the issues in an interesting way.
Although he does not call the imputation a "fiction," in a 1997 article Professor
Dan Kahan advanced an alternative account of the imputation as a motivated
departure from accurate description.202 Professor Kahan argued that, contrary to the
Holmesian rationale, lawmakers and judges do not forbid the ignorance-of-law
defense because they want citizens to inform themselves about the law. If this were
the goal, Professor Kahan argues, then the appropriate standard would be
something akin to negligence, under which defendants would be held liable only if
they had culpably failed to try to inform themselves about the law. Holding
defendants strictly liable regardless of their efforts to inform themselves, he
continues, does not provide the right incentive.203 According to Professor Kahan,
1' See, e.g., id. at 638 ("[L]aw might or ought be knowable by all who are bound to obey it, but
that any actual system is knowable, is ridiculously and notoriously false."); Hall & Seligman, supra note
190, at 660 ("lI]t is not ... an exaggeration to say that it is literally impossible for a citizen to assemble
all the relevant rules ... which might apply to his daily conduct ... ."); Keedy, supra note 190, at 78
("Under modern conditions,... it would hardly be seriously maintained that ['the law is certain and
capable of being ascertained'].").
'99 It is unfair, this argument continues, to hold a defendant responsible for violating a law of which
the defendant was unaware; when a defendant does not know that his or her conduct is illegal and is
subjected to criminal liability anyway, the defendant's punishment is out of step with the purposes of
imposing criminal liability. See, e.g., Grace, supra note 190, at 1395-96 (arguing for "a mistake of law
defense for laws that criminalize ordinary behavior"); see also Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion
and the Fairness oflNotice: Confronting 'Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1, 1-5 (1995).
" See, e.g., Davies, supra note 46, at 350 n.38; Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61
EMORY LJ. 69, 83 (2011) ("The expectation that the law is 'definite and knowable' is no more tenable
for police today than it is for the lay public."); Pilcher, supra note 199, at 14 ("[E]ven if there was once a
time when the criminal law was so simple and limited in scope that such a presumption was justified, it
is now an 'obvious fiction' and 'so far-fetched ... as to be quixotic.'"); Grace, supra note 190, at 1395-96
("[I]n modern times, this presumption is largely fictional.").
201 Some have predicted that, as a result, courts will eventually abandon the bar on the ignorance
defense. See Yochum, Death, supra note 193, at 673.
202 Kahan, supra note 193.
203 Id. at 133-36, 140.
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the ban on the ignorance-of-the-law defense is best explained as a device of
"prudent obfuscation" that judges use to veil their need for "flexibility to adapt the
law to innovative forms of crime ex post."204 Judges cannot directly avow their need
for such flexibility, since they do not want their decisions to seem standardless. In
some respects, this explanation resembles the classic conception of legal fictions
described above, according to which they allow judges to adjust law to new
circumstances. 205 But it is difficult to understand the argument as a defense of the
classic understanding of legal fictions. Professor Kahan considers the imputation of
legal knowledge to criminal defendants to be both descriptively inaccurate and
probably permanently necessary. 206 To him, the device allows judges to conceal
what they are really doing (adjusting the application of legal rules to circumstances)
by saying that they are doing something else (just assuming that all know the
law). 207 While this departure from descriptive accuracy might seem inconsistent
with a legal commitment to ascertaining the truth, Professor Kahan suggests that
this latter commitment sometimes rightly gives way to other normative goals. 208
The persistence of this fiction is not easy to explain, and I do not propose to
explain it in this Article. The tenacity of this fiction in the face of criticism does,
however, reinforce my conclusion about the inadequacy of the classic understanding
of legal fictions. Recognizing the ignorance-of-the-law maxim as a fiction has not
led either to its disavowal or to its conclusive justification as a known falsehood.
The continued meaningfulness of the maxim also suggests that assumptions of
omniscience may play an important role in legal justification even when they are
recognized as descriptively inaccurate. The legal device discussed in the next part
offer an especially good example of the justificatory utility of assumptions of
omniscience.
C. The PHOSITA's Knowledge of the Pertinent Prior Art
1. Scope and Function.-Patent law in the United States and elsewhere2 09
makes extensive use of a construct known as the "person having ordinary skill in the
art," now often called the PHOSITA.210 This phrase refers to the perspective from
204 Id. at 139-41 ("[Tihe doctrine attempts to discourage legal knowledge (prudent obfuscation) so
that individuals will be more inclined to behave morally (legal moralism)." (emphasis omitted)).
205 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. As discussed above, however, under that conception,
such adjustments are necessarily not permanent features of the law. Professor Kahan, in contrast, posits
a permanent need for flexibility in criminal law, and it is not clear that his argument is necessarily
limited to criminal law.
206 See Kahan, supra note 193, at 150.
207 See id.
m See id. at 152.
29 See Richard Weiner, Nonobviousness: Foreign Approaches, in NONOBVIOUSNESs-THE
ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 7:402 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980); see also infra
notes 210 & 212.
210 This abbreviation was coined by Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. REs. & ED. 433, 438 (1966), and adopted by the Federal Circuit
in Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1984), but the
underlying notion dates to a mid-nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision, Hotchkiss v
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which judges assessing the validity and scope of patent claims are to apply a
number of the law's requirements. The original context in which this construct
arose, and still perhaps the most challenging and important context in which it
applies, is that of determining the obviousness of an invention. The inventor of a
new product or process may receive a patent only if it would not have been
"obvious" to the PHOSITA to make the product or use the process at the time of
its invention.2 11
Patent law also requires patent examiners and judges to assume the
PHOSITA's perspective in other areas, including assessment of the novelty and
212utility of an invention, as well as an assessment of whether the patent
application's description enables the invention.2 3 Nonobviousness, however, is by
many accounts the most important inquiry based on the construct.214 It is also the
context in which the PHOSITA construct's nature and application is most
illuminating for the topic of this Article.
In the obviousness context, the PHOSITA has two key characteristics: first, it
is an entirely hypothetical perspective, and second, it has "omniscient" knowledge
of the pertinent prior art. The PHOSITA has famously been described as a
"ghost[]"21 5 and a "doppelganger,"216 and the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 253 (1850) (referring to the "ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business"
in connection with the precursor to modern nonobviousness analysis).
21 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (requiring that the "non-obvious[ness]" of an invention be assessed from
the perspective of "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.").
Similar standards appear in the patent law of Canada and the European Union. See Canada Patent Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, § 28.3 ("The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a patent ...
must be subject-matter that would not have been obvious .. . to a person skilled in the art or science to
which it pertains . . . ."); European Patent Convention art. 56, Sept. 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 17) page 116
("An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art,
it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.").
212 An invention is novel if it is not anticipated by the prior art, which includes publications and
issued patents existing at the time of the invention. Since 1876, U.S. courts have held that prior art may
anticipate a patent if the prior art "exhibit[s] the later patented invention in such a full and intelligible
manner as to enable persons skilled in the art to which the invention is related to comprehend it without
assistance from the patent, or to make it. . . ." Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 370 (1876). An
invention is useful if it performs some benefit and is not impossible to construct, operate, or generate. In
assessing the utility of an invention, U.S. courts similarly ask "whether a person having ordinary skill in
the art . . . has reason to doubt the objective truth of the [patent] applicant's assertions" regarding the
benefit and operability of the invention described. Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 1491, 1493 (2011).
213 The Patent Act explicitly mentions a "skilled in the art" perspective in connection with
enablement: the patent disclosure must "contain a written description of the invention ... in such ...
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same. . .
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
214 See, e.g., Joseph P. Meara, Just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent
Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 272 (2002) (calling obviousness "the most
litigated aspect of patent law"); John 0. Tresansky, PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic
Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 37, 37 (1991) ("The most frequent use
of the skill level in an art ... is in determining whether an invention meets the ... condition for
patentability of nonobviousness .. . .").
215 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cit. 1987) (describing
PHOSITA as "not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other ghosts in the law").
2014-2015]1 519
VETC'YVT AAT TOITDV AI
520 L t. .
have repeatedly emphasized its difference from the perspectives of actual inventors,
patent applicants, examiners, and judges.2 17 The PHOSITA is a fictional figure
that judges are directed to tailor-generate for each inquiry into obviousness.
Sometimes, the PHOSITA's likeness to a fictional character is very close to the
surface, as this passage from a 1966 opinion illustrates:
We think the proper way to apply the ... obviousness test to a case like this is to
first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references-
which he is presumed to know-hanging on the walls around him. One then
notes that what [the] applicant. . . built here he admits is basically a Gerbe bag
holder [an invention disclosed in a prior art reference] having air-blast bag
opening to which he has added two bag retaining pins. ... [The applicant] would
have said to himself, 'Now what can I do to hold them more securely?' Looking
around the walls, he sees Hellman's envelopes with holes in their flaps hung on a
rod [another prior art reference]. He would then say to himself, 'Ha. I can punch
holes in my bags and put a little rod (pin) through the holes. That will hold them.
After filling the bags, I'll pull them off the pins as does Hellman. Scoring the flap
should make tearing easier. 2 18
This vignette engages most extensively with the PHOSITA's imaginary,
constructed status. It mentions only in passing the other crucial characteristic of the
PHOSITA posited for inquiries into obviousness: the PHOSITA is "presumed to
know" all the "prior art references," that is, all available information about related
or "pertinent" inventions existing when the inventor conceived the claimed
invention (or, now, when the inventor applied for a patent on it), regardless of the
salience of that information. 219 These two characteristics make the PHOSITA
surprisingly similar to at least some fictions of legislative omniscience. The
216 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specifc?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1187 (2002).
217 See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Standard Oil Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Kleinman, 484 F.2d 1389, 1392
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
218 In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see also Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have
Gender?, 19 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &L. 881, 890-91 (2011). This scene captures the standard
features of the PHOSITA in the nonobviousness analysis: this person knows all of the pertinent prior
art and is in that sense omniscient. The person is also capable of combining these prior art teachings to
come up with a putatively new invention that is, nevertheless, obvious to this PHOSITA, and therefore
unpatentable. The PHOSITA is less inventive, in other words, than the successful patent applicant,
even though the PHOSITA also knows more than the successful patent applicant does or often can
know about the pertinent prior art.
219 See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 454-55 (1818); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The legal construct ... presumes that all prior art references in the field of the
invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan."); Tresansky, supra note 214, at 40-41
("While an inventor is no longer presumed to have knowledge of all material prior art, the hypothetical
PHOSITA, although possessed only of ordinary skill, is presumed to be aware of all of the pertinent
prior art."); Jonathan J. Darrow, Note, The Neglected Dimension ofPatent Law's PHOSITA Standard,
23 HARv.J.L. &TECH. 227, 235 (2009) ("[T]he PHOSITA is presumed to have read, understood, and
remembered every existing reference from the prior art." (citing, inter alia, Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover
Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 493 (1900) (holding that an inventor must have familiarity with all preexisting
devices))).
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PHOSITA is acknowledged to be an unreal construct, not just because it does not
correspond to any actual human being, but also because it knows a body of
information that no actual person would be at all likely, or in some cases able, to
know.
Unlike the omniscient legislature, however, the PHOSITA is largely seen as
not only defensible, but indispensable. Embrace of the PHOSITA has, to be sure,
shifted over the years as judicial definition of its characteristics has passed from the
Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit and back again, but commitment to the
construct itself has never been in question-rather, debates over it have concerned
the best way to conceive of and use the device. 220 Commentary on the PHOSITA
has thus explored some issues seldom addressed in connection with other fictions of
omniscience.
2. Justifications for the Construct.-Although the PHOSITA's paradoxical
features might seem to make the perspective difficult for a decision-maker to
assume, courts appear willing to assume a PHOSITA-like perspective to assess an
increasingly wide variety of questions. Most commentators also seem to view the
construct not as a problem but as a useful and important device.
The PHOSITA's two features-its imaginary status and its omniscience-are
typically justified differently. The detachment of the PHOSITA perspective from
any actual person's perspective is usually described as a tool for preventing
hindsight bias. Otherwise, it might be tempting for an examiner or judge to regard
an achieved invention as obvious, even though it would not have been obvious to
the inventor's contemporaries. 22' Forcing decision-makers to displace themselves
from their real-life vantage points in space and time compels them to step back
from their own assumptions-to engage in metacognition. This understanding of
the PHOSITA's function may explain commentators' tendency to recommend that
the PHOSITA's characteristics be sharpened and specified, or made more
"lifelike." Some scholars have suggested, for example, limiting the prior art to
which the PHOSITA would have access 222 or endowing the PHOSITA with
220 The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Telelex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007), clarified that the PHOSITA should be understood as able to combine the "teachings" of
scattered prior art references to achieve obvious insights rather than simply able to extrapolate from
shortcomings of particular prior inventions, contrary to the Federal Circuit's then-prevailing test for
obviousness in light of prior art: 'The idea that a [PHOSITA] designer hoping to make [an invention
like the one at issue in KSR] would ignore [a particular prior art reference] because [it] was designed to
solve [a different problem] makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton." Id. at 420-21. This standard suggests an even greater role for judicial
fictionalizing, in the sense of imaginatively taking the PHOSITA's perspective, than the Federal Circuit
had at that point been willing to endorse. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures,
120 YALE LJ. 2, 51-56 (2010) (discussing KSR in context of Supreme Court's recent patent
jurisprudence).
221 See Tresansky, supra note 214, at 49-50.
222 See Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of
Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2070, 2102 (2011) (making this
recommendation); see also Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919,
959-63 (2011) (making similar recommendation in the context of novelty).
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ordinary economic incentives and motives.22 3
The hindsight-bias justification does not directly apply, however, to
imputations of "omniscience" 224 to the PHOSITA. This feature of the PHOSITA
has been more gingerly defended. One rationale offered for it should seem familiar:
assuming omniscience is thought to avoid "difficult issues of proof related to the
inventor's actual knowledge."225 But the characteristic is also required by the
necessarily public nature of the inquiry involved in nonobviousness (and other
patent validity) analyses. An inventor is entitled to a patent if the invention claimed
would not have been obvious to anyone with the technical competence to use
it-not just if the invention was not obvious to the actual inventor. To determine
whether this is the case, a decision-maker must necessarily consider the
information that might have been available to potential competitor-inventors, and
not just the information actually known to the inventor. Both the PHOSITA's
hypothetical status and its omniscience help courts answer that central question.
As noted, the PHOSITA's omniscience has been treated more skeptically than
its fictionality. The chief reason for this skepticism will by now be easy to
anticipate: omniscience is a descriptively inaccurate feature for even a fictional
construct to have, since it could not realistically be imputed to any real inventor,
patent applicant, examiner, or judge.226 This argument, however, is far less widely
endorsed than the analogous argument against assumptions of legislative
omniscience. Overall, judges and commentators seem untroubled by both features
of the PHOSITA-its fictionality and its omniscience.
Yet the parallels between the PHOSITA and assumptions of legislative
omniscience are striking. Both involve a posited perspective that is deemed to have
a special generative relationship to a legally significant text that needs construal.
And both impute to that perspective an unrealistic access to publicly available
technical and largely textual matter-and, through that matter, to the "minds" of
other members of the relevant specialist community. The discontinuities between
the PHOSITA and the other fictions considered in this Article are also, however,
worth noting. The PHOSITA is far more elaborated-more theorized and more
richly "characterized"-than either assumptions of legislative omniscience or the
various doctrines of constructive notice. And the PHOSITA appears far more
223 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard ofPatentability, 120 YALE
L.J. 1590, 1598-1600 (2011). Professors Abramowicz and Duffy also argue that courts should allow the
PHOSITA perspective to be that of a corporate entity, thus incorporating some of the kinds of fictions
discussed in Part III.A above. Id. at 1615-16.
" Darrow, supra note 219, at 235 nn.39 & 40 (discussing differing characterizations of the
PHOSITA's omniscience).
225 Id. at 235.
226 See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 223, at 1606-07 ("The mind of this hypothetical
person comes equipped with a complete and thorough knowledge of all legally pertinent prior art, far
more knowledge than could be possessed by any average or actual researcher."); Daralyn J. Durie &
Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness ofInventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
989, 991-94 (2008) (arguing that PHOSITA perspective should be applied based "on what the
PHOSITA and the marketplace actually know and believe"); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Offce, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001) (explaining inaccessibility of much prior art).
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firmly accepted than either the assumption of legislative omniscience or the
criminal defendant's imputed legal knowledge. The divergences noted in the latter
two areas between what commentators are saying and what courts are doing are
largely absent in patent law. Part IV draws on these patterns to suggest a
reconceptualization of the work done by assumptions of legislative omniscience in
judicial opinions and commentary.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PATTERNS AND EVALUATING THE FICTIONS
OF LEGISLATIVE OMNISCIENCE
The discussion so far has shown, first, that commentators widely disapprove of
assumptions of legislative omniscience, considering them descriptively inaccurate
fictions that, because of their inaccuracy, undermine judicial legitimacy. Standard
accounts of legal fictions, however, do not indicate exactly why these assumptions
are problematic. In fact, the assumptions commentators criticize do not really seem
to fit the standard accounts of legal fictions at all. Part II suggested an explanation
for this apparent mismatch: the limited scope of our understanding of legal fictions,
which has not advanced much beyond the form it had reached in the early
twentieth century. Work on the phenomenon of fiction in other scholarly
disciplines, in contrast, has advanced far beyond early twentieth-century models.
These advances suggest a variety of ways of building out our understanding of legal
fictions. Such an updated understanding might, among other things, take account
of the frames of reference within which propositions about fictional entities are
advanced and/or discussed, as well as the potential functions, other than supplying
accurate description, that such propositions might perform for writers and
especially readers. Part III then explored the presence in other legal areas of
propositions similar to the so-called fictions of legislative omniscience. Unlike
assumptions of legislative omniscience, doctrines of constructive notice and the
PHOSITA device are not generally considered threats to the legitimacy of judicial
decision-making.
These observations suggest that certain aspects of assumptions of legislative
omniscience might not be as troubling as virtually all commentators have assumed.
Other aspects of those assumptions, however, might deserve further analysis and
perhaps the criticism they have received. Either way, the usual casual dismissal of
assumptions of legislative omniscience is not warranted. The remaining paragraphs
of this Article will draw on the material presented in earlier Parts to support this
conclusion.
A significant theme emerging from the discussion in Parts II and III is the
importance of clarifying the frames of reference from within which assertions about
fictional entities are made in considering the work those assertions do. One could
think of these frames of references as discourse "worlds." A fictive utterance about
Sherlock Holmes is made from within the discourse world of a narrative
concerning Sherlock Holmes. A transfictive or metafictive utterance about
Sherlock Holmes is made from within a different discourse world, one that
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includes the fictional discourse world but also allows for assertions about matters of
fact outside that narrative that can be evaluated for descriptive accuracy. This kind
of clarification is a basic step in philosophical analysis of fiction and fictionalizing.
Part III.A showed how Professor Kahan, without using precisely the same
terminology, seems to have arrived at a similar conclusion in analyzing the
ignorantia maxim.227 Understanding assumptions of legislative omniscience can
benefit from a similar treatment. References to these assumptions (sometimes
characterizing them as fictions) occur from within two frames of reference: the
world of judicial discourse and the world of scholarly discourse.
Since the scholarly criticism of these assumptions focuses on their operation
within the first world, that of judicial discourse, most of this Part will address that
frame of reference. But it is also important to consider how the assertions function
within the second world, that of scholarly discourse. Assertions about assumptions
of legislative omniscience within this frame of reference are like transfictive or,
more often, metafictive utterances. They identify the assumptions as fictions and
evaluate them using the same standards that we use to evaluate references to actual
entities. Scholarly assertions about these particular assumptions are not the kind of
"theoretical fictions" identified by Vaihinger, Fuller, and other writers on legal
fictions. These scholarly assertions are used not to justify doctrine, but to criticize
it, or more precisely to propose a faulty justification for it. In this way, they
resemble assertions about fictional characters that find fault with the characters for
not being real people. It is, nevertheless, mainly due to this commentary that we
recognize the assumptions of legislative omniscience as fictions (and indeed, they
are fictions), even though commentators' observation that the assumptions are
fictions does not much advance our understanding of them, for the reasons
presented above. 228
The scholarly commentary focuses, of course, on the propriety of judges'
assertions about legislative omniscience, or of judicial assertions that scholars think
presuppose this omniscience. Judges' assertions need to be analyzed differently
from scholars', since judges make their assertions within a different discourse
world. Put differently, when scholars make assertions about judicial assumptions of
legislative omniscience, they are telling stories about courts (and, in recent
scholarship, about legislatures as well). Judges making assertions about what
legislatures know are, in contrast, telling stories mainly about legislatures (but
perhaps also about judges), and more specifically about what the law is and what
rules it includes.
Although judges often make claims about what legislatures know, judges do not
usually identify these assertions as fictions, and they do not often explicitly impute
"omniscience" to legislatures. Rather, most often judges deem the legislature to be
" See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
228 In addition to collapsing the worlds of scholarly and judicial discourse, some scholarship in this
area collapses both such worlds with the further distinct discourse worlds of non-legal everyday life and
of statutory enactments. Cf Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 17, at 785 (asking, in arguing
against the rule against redundancies, "Does the average citizen not repeat herself for emphasis or to
'cover all the bases'. . . ?).
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aware of or to know certain specific information.2 29 But within the story that
judicial opinions collectively tell about the body of legal rules, we can take these
deemings to be assertions that the legislature "knows" something that it might not
actually have known or had the capacity to know, and in that sense to impute
something like omniscience-a superhuman state of knowledge-to the
legislature.230 As Part I discussed, this deeming has two distinct components: the
personification of the legislature and the imputation to that personified collective of
certain unlikely knowledge. Because the material discussed above has clearer
implications for the second of these components, this discussion will consider it
first.
The presence elsewhere in the law of imputations of unrealistic knowledge (as
discussed in Part III), and their complete acceptance in some of those other areas,
suggests that there is not necessarily anything inherently problematic about the
unrealistic nature of these imputations. Indeed, the apparently independent
development of these deemings in diverse legal areas suggests that they might
perform some useful function. Whatever this function is, it is not that of accurate
description. But the deemings might be useful for other purposes. The classic
theory of legal fictions holds that such fictions may have value as tools for legal
adjustment or as theoretical justifications for legal rules. Neither of these accounts
seems to fit the imputation of unrealistic knowledge to a legislature. The work
from psychologists and literary scholars discussed in Part II, however, suggests a
229 Judicial opinions usually simply "presume," "assume," or "deem" the legislature to be aware of
certain information; they rarely describe these presumptions, assumptions, or deemings as fictions (and
they rarely call the knowledge "omniscience"), as the table below suggests. This table summarizes results
of Westlaw searches in the database of all state and federal cases, run July 2, 2014:
Search string Number of results
(presum! Is legisl! /s know!) 7,950
(presum! s legisl! /s awar!) 4,947
(presum! Is legisl! Is omnisc!) 7
(assum! Is legisl! /s know!) 2,268
(assum! s legisl! /s awar!) 1,942
(assum! Is legisl! /s omnisc!) 15
(deem! Is legisl! /s know!) 1,026
(deem! Is legisl! /s awar!) 817
(deem! /s legisl! /s omnisc!) 0
(fict! /s legisl! Is know!) 293
(fict! /s legisl! Is awar!) 22
(fict! Is legisl! /s omnisc!) 2
Search Results, WESTLAWNEXT, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (use the search bar to type in the exact
'search string" presented in each row, then click on "Cases"; then narrow by using "All Dates Before
07-03-2014").
230 For further typical examples of this kind of deeming, see Liberty Loan Corp. of Ill. v. Federal
National Mortgage Ass'n, 492 N.E.2d 237, 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("[T]he legislature is presumed to
be aware of judicial decisions which have construed prior legislation and where no change is made are
considered to be in accord with the decision." (citing Kozak v. Ret. Bd. of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit
Fund of Chi., 447 N.E.2d 394, 398 (Ill. 1983) ("We must presume that in adopting that amendment
the legislature was aware of judicial decisions concerning prior and existing law and legislation."))).
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different sense in which fictions can be useful: practice in imputing mental states to
fictional characters may be useful to readers in exercising and confirming their
abilities to impute mental states to others as well as to engage in metacognition,
reflecting on the sources and limits of their own beliefs and predictions. These
abilities do not give us access to any definitive truth (we are neither telepathic nor
omniscient), but they are indispensable to our everyday lives, as well as to legal
behavior and discourse.
Within judicial discourse, when a judge imputes an unlikely awareness to a
legislature, the judge is telling a story in which the legislature has knowledge that
the judge him- or herself would not necessarily have before doing research or
receiving information from parties or clerks. Considered in this light, the judge
imputing unrealistic knowledge to the legislature might be not making an unfair
demand, but rather describing (and enacting) what it would be like to be
omniscient, presenting that state as an ideal one for actors in the legal system to be
in, and attributing that ideal state to the legislature as the utterer, or "narrator," of
statutory law. 23' Judges might do this, as well, to remind themselves and their
colleagues of their obligations and to reassert the basic rules of the game they are
playing. Those rules include the legal aspirations to approach, as nearly as possible,
the accurate imputation of mental states, as well as complete and impartial access to
and use of all pertinent information. 232 In this regard, courts' imputations of
"omniscience" to the legislature can be understood simply as reaffirmations of these
goals as among the master rules of the legal game and invitations to all engaged in
the game to keep taking the legislature's pronouncements seriously. Legislative
supremacy entails a kind of legislative omnipotence-the power to declare the law
subject only to constitutional constraints. Such omnipotence makes little sense
without omniscience. It is difficult to describe the enactments of an uninformed
lawmaker as deserving respect.
Although it proceeds in less familiar terms, this explanation of the functions of
assertions of legislative omniscience is consistent with the empirical and political
values embraced in even the most recent commentary on statutory interpretation.
Of course, we can never fully meet our aspirations to perfectly accurate mental state
imputation and command of the entire body of legal rules, but empiricists aspire to
a similar completely informed perspective. They just propose a different path
toward that goal. And the ideals implied by references to omniscience are very
much like the "rule of law" principles that Professors Gluck and Bressman propose
as a potential justification for many of the canons they identify as based on
231 This argument is consistent with, but goes well beyond, Professor Smith's argument that
"[]udges . . . cling to premises, either consciously or subconsciously, that will produce legal rules with
positive expressive value." Smith, supra note 36, at 1478. Professor Smith is ultimately unwilling to
endorse this as a full defense of the legal fictions he discusses: "The argument for dispensing with
judicial candor is strongest when the court uses the new legal fiction to serve a legitimating function, but
even in such cases we must be skeptical about the need for obfuscation." Id. at 1491.
232 Cf Nourse, supra note 28, at 1124 (describing resort to legislative history as appropriate because
it functions as "a process of externalized self-discipline by which the interpreters' ideological
predispositions are measured against the best information about other people's meanings").
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inaccurate characterizations of legislative activity.2 33
The account just provided suggests a value-a rhetorical, expressive, and
perhaps even cognitive value rather than one related to truth-for the judicial
practice of imputing unrealistic knowledge to a legislature. It has not addressed
whether the other component of the legislative omniscience fiction-the
personification of the legislature-has any similar value. Like the imputation of
unrealistic knowledge, the practice of personifying a collective for legal purposes
occurs in many areas of law, most obviously in the personification of business
associations.234 This Article has not sought to canvass these parallels systematically.
Nevertheless, the material presented in Part II suggests some of the observations
we could make and some of the questions we might ask in a study of personifying
fictions. For one thing, the personification of groups is not unique to legal practices
and ways of talking. From childhood, we impute mental states to things that
cannot have them. 235 But does it make sense for us to think of reading the "mind"
of a group, or to aspire to do so, within legal discourse? If we say that we can do so,
are we enacting or reinforcing any basic aspirations of our legal system? Might it
make more sense to develop another set of terms, different from those we use to
talk about human beings, for explaining why we hold these groups responsible for
some of their collective acts and for deciding when we will do so? Such an approach
could allow us to be more sensitive to the differences among the various groups we
recognize as legal actors. It might make sense, for example, to impute to a group
like a legislature, whose primary reason for assembly and functioning is the capacity
to perform legal acts, a legally ideal "mental state," 236 while it might not make as
233 See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 4, at 961. Professors Gluck and Bressman contend
that for this justification to be a workable one, courts must themselves actually behave consistently
rather than merely aspire to consistency. See id. at 962. This argument, however, assumes that
legislatures are the primary or only audience for judicial opinions.
234 See supra note 167. There are important differences between imputations of unrealistic
knowledge and personifications of groups. Most basically, the personification of groups does not seem
directly linked to avowed aims of our legal system, such as accurate mental-state imputation and
command of the legal corpus, in the same way that assumptions of omniscience are. Omniscience is (an
admittedly extreme expression of) a fusndamental legal ideal in a way that the treatment of groups as
knowing agents is not.
235 See supra note 137 and accompanying discussion. Popular responses to the legal personification
of collectives tend to be far more skeptical than the attitudes of many commentators and judges. See,
e.g., David Post, What's Wrong with the Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/09/whats-wrong-with-the-
hobby-lobby-decision/ ("[I] have a hard time conceptualizing how this fictional person, Hobby Lobby,
Inc., has a religion, and a hard time conceptualizing how it exercises that religion.") (discussing Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)); Dave Schmidt, Local Voices, North Zone, Mar.
30: Tax Burden, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011
-03-30/opinion/ct-vp-0330localvoicesnorthzoneletters2Oll0330_1_mortgage-interest-tax-burden-tax-
rate (criticizing Tribune editorial supporting elimination of tax deduction for mortgage interest
payments: "VVhy should a business (which is, after all, a legal fiction) be able to take out a loan for the
purchase of an asset and write off the interest but a family (made up of non-fictitious, real people) be
unable to do the same thing? . . . What you are proposing is an insult to the real, living, breathing
persons who make up this country at the expense of fictional entities who only exist via the fiction of
legal 'personhood' under state corporate law.").
236 But see Nourse, supra note 28, at 1148-49 (describing purposivist view of Congress as
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much sense to do the same for groups assembled for other purposes.
CONCLUSION
Commentators routinely condemn assumptions of legislative omniscience as
unrealistic fictions that, because of their inaccuracy, undermine judicial legitimacy.
But the classic account of legal fictions does not tell us exactly why these
assumptions are problematic, largely because that classic account has remained
undeveloped since the early twentieth century. Advances in other disciplines
toward a more nuanced understanding of fictional discourse suggest several ways of
improving our understanding of legal fictions, including fictions of legislative
omniscience. When we take the insights of philosophers, cognitive scientists, and
literary scholars into account, and consider fictions of legislative omniscience
alongside similar, more widely accepted, unrealistic imputations of knowledge to
legal actors in other areas of law, we can justify at least some elements of
assumptions of legislative omniscience in a new way. Judges' imputations of
unrealistic knowledge to legislatures are not unfair demands, but important parts of
the story judges tell about the law, that story according to which judges are
authorized to make legal decisions about what the legislature has done. These
imputations of omniscience assert, as a legal ideal, the possibility of completely
accurate description of mental states and full command of the legal corpus. In
particular, the imputations seem to be necessary corollaries of the principle of
legislative supremacy. In this way, these imputations are reminders of the basic
rules of the game judges and lawyers play. This account is not a complete defense
of judicial assumptions of legislative omniscience; it leaves for another day a full
answer to the question of whether the personification of the legislature into an
entity capable of knowledge is also defensible. But as long as we treat the legislature
as a legal actor, we should not be concerned about imputing unrealistic knowledge
to it. Far from impairing judicial legitimacy, such imputations are expressions of
the grounds of both legislative and judicial legitimacy.
"describ[ing] judicial, not legislative, virtue: 'precision in drafting, consciousness of interpretive rules,
discovery of meaning in past precedent, and detached reflection on the language of particular texts'").
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